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THE OPPORTUNITY TO PLAY BALL:
TITLE IX, UNIVERSITY COMPLIANCE
AND EQUAL PAY
I. Introduction
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972' has been
instrumental in the inception of gender equity in intercollegiate
athletic programs.2 In the past few years, Title IX has helped women
make great strides towards equality in athletics.' While the number
of women competing in intercollegiate athletics has risen
dramatically, 4 Title IX has not yet reached the goal of equality of
Pub. L. No. 92-318, 901-09, 86 Stat. 235 (codified as amended by the Civil Rights
Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) at 20 U.S.C. §§
1681-88 (1994)).
2 See William E. Thro & Brian A. Snow, Cohen v. Brown University and the Future
of Intercollegiate and Interscholastic Athletics, 84 EDUC. L. REP. 611, 611 (1993). For
a discussion of the National Collegiate Athletic Association's ("NCAA") attempts to
dismantle Title IX's protection for intercollegiate women athletes, see Loretta M. Lamar,
To Be an Equitist or Not: A View of Title IX, 1 SPORTS LAW J. 237, 241-42 (Spring
1994).
Thro & Snow, supra note 2, at 611; see also T. Jesse Wilde, Gender Equity in
Athletics: Coming of Age in the 90's, 4 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 217, 229 (Spring 1994)
(stating that "Title IX has been the primary catalyst for the growth of women's
intercollegiate athletics"); Jane Gottesman, Stanford Boosts Women Sports with New
Teams, Scholarships, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 31, 1993, at Al (reporting that Stanford
University has taken numerous steps toward gender equity in athletics including a
commitment to add three varsity women's sports by 1996-97); Carol Herwig, Title IX
Spurs Rise in Women's Programs, USA TODAY, Apr. 9, 1993, at 8C (indicating that
among the schools which have recently added a new women's varsity sports team are
Clemson, Minnesota, Ohio State, Indiana, Texas A&M, and UCLA); see also infra note
36.
4 Thro & Snow, supra note 2, at 611; see also Sally B. Donnelly, Work That Body!;
Fewer Curves, More Muscles: A Sweat Soaked Revolution Redefines the Shape of Beauty,
TIME, Fall 1990, at 68 (stating that "[bly 1989 there were 130,000 women competing in
collegiate sports throughout the U.S., in contrast to 32,000 in 1972"); Judy Mann, A Leg
Up for the Underdogs, WASH. POST, June 19, 1992, at E3 (reporting that during that
1971-72 collegiate sports season, women comprised sixteen percent of college athletes
compared to approximately thirty-three percent in 1992). In addition to the increased
number of intercollegiate women athletes, the number of athletic scholarships available
for women has increased from 60 in 1974 to approximately 500 in 1981. Robert
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participation in intercollegiate athletics by gender.5 In addition, Title
IX has helped spark a trend towards equal pay for the coaches of
women's intercollegiate sports teams and the coaches of men's
intercollegiate sports teams.6 However, this goal has not been
achieved either.7
This Note discusses Title IX's prohibition of sex
discrimination in intercollegiate athletic programs receiving federal
financial assistance. Part I will introduce the history and scope of
Title IX, and will establish the regulatory framework within which
equal athletic opportunity claims are analyzed. Part II will discuss
recent cases regarding compliance with Title IX's equal opportunity
provisions while Part III describes the effects of those cases on
intercollegiate athletic programs. Next, Part IV will discuss Title
IX's role in providing equal pay for athletic coaches by presenting
recent cases under both Title IX and the Equal Pay Act. The
following sections will consider the equal pay debate; and will
establish that Title IX requires equivalent pay for the coaches of
men's and women's intercollegiate athletic teams. The Note will then
assess the ramifications of the equal pay litigation by examining the
recent movement toward equal pay at some colleges and universities.
Finally, the role of institutions of higher education in complying with
Title IX will be explored before the Note concludes by forecasting the
future of gender equity in intercollegiate athletic programs.
Sullivan, A Law that Needs New Muscle, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Mar. 4, 1985, at 9.
1 Thro & Snow, supra note 2, at 612; Lamar, supra note 2, at 238; see also Jennifer
L. Henderson, Gender Equity in Intercollegiate Athletics: A Commitment to Fairness, 5
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 133, 134 (1995) (observing that "twenty years after its
enactment, the purpose of Title IX remains unrealized"); Joseph P. Williams, Lower Pay
for Women's Coaches: Refuting Some Common Justifications, 21 J.C. & U.L. 643, 645-
46 (1995) (observing that "despite ... advances ... women continue to be the victims
of great disparities in athletic programs when compared against their male counterparts"
and detailing numerous inequities between male and female college athletic programs).
6 See Wilde, supra note 3, at 217. See generally Williams, supra note 5.
7 See Denise K. Stellmach, Note, Title IX: The Mandate for Equality in Collegiate
Athletics, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 203, 207 (Fall 1994) (observing that despite
"reinvigoration of Title IX, however, many inequities remain"); Wilde, supra note 3, at
237; Williams, supra note 5, at 647-51 (detailing inequities between coaches of men's
and women's intercollegiate athletic teams).
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II. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
A. History and Scope of Title IX
Title IX was passed under the Education Amendments of
1972.8 It was enacted to prevent sex discrimination in any program
that received federal financial assistance.9 The relevant section states,
"[n]o person in-the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.""° However, due to the broad
language of Title IX, there was debate and confusion in academia
about the meaning of the new statute. Much of the confusion was
the result of the lack of a congressional committee report with the
bill12 and the presence of only two comments regarding intercollegiate
athletics during the entire congressional debate.13 One view, the
"institution-wide approach," interpreted the statute to mean that the
receipt of federal funds by any program within a university would
require the entire institution to comply with Title IX.14 The opposing
view, the "program-specific approach," took the position that only
820 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1994) (Pub. L. 92-318, Title IX, § 901, Jun. 23, 1972, 86
Stat. 1862).
9 See generally ELLEN J. VARGYAS, BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS: A LEGAL GUIDE
To TITLE IX 6 (1994).
10 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
" See, e.g., Ojay Grace, Comment, Does Phrase "Program or Activity"" Mean
Recipient Institution or Recipient Department of the Institution?, 10 THURGOOD
MARSHALL L. REV. 467 (1985); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 893 (1st Cir.
1993). The confusion was focused primarily on which programs would come within the
scope of Title IX and how the government would assess compliance. Id.
12 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 893.
13 Id.; see 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1972) (reporting Sen. Bayh as
stating that Title IX permits disparate treatment based upon gender only in "very unusual
cases where such treatment is absolutely necessary to the success of the program-such
as in ... sports facilities"); 117 CONG. REc. 30,407 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1971) (reporting
Sen. Bayh as commenting that, "[w]e are not requiring that intercollegiate football be
desegregated, nor that the men's locker room be desegregated").
14 This approach was taken by two Third Circuit decisions, both of which were
subsequently overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Grove City College v.
Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). See Grove City College v. Bell, 687 F.2d 684 (3d Cir.
1982); Haffer v. Temple Univ., 688 F.2d 14 (3d Cir. 1982).
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those university programs which themselves directly received federal
financial assistance were bound by Title IX.15
In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court completely altered Title
IX's focus in Grove City College v. Bell.'6 The decision made Title
IX program-specific and, by doing so, severely limited its scope.' 7
The Court interpreted the statutory language "program or activity" to
apply only to those actual programs which received federal funding. 8
Therefore, the federal funding of a single program of a college would
not trigger an institution-wide obligation to create a non-
discriminatory policy.' 9 Since most athletic departments did not
directly receive any federal funding, Title IX did not apply to
intercollegiate athletics.2 °
'5 See, e.g., Hillsdale College v. Department of Health and Educ. Welfare, 696 F.2d
418 (6th Cir. 1981) (discussing the institution-wide and program-specific approaches and
adopting the program-specific view).
16 465 U.S. 555 (1984). In Bell, four students sued the school and the school sued
the department of education seeking a declaration that the Department of Education's
termination of students' financial assistance based on the college's failure to execute
assurance of compliance with Title IX was void. Id.at 561.
17 Justice Brennan made this observation in dissent:
[E]ach of the factors relevant to the interpretation of the program-
specificity requirements of Title IX, taken individually or
collectively, demonstrates that the Court today limits the reach of
Title IX in a way that was wholly unintended by Congress. The
contemporaneous legislative history of Title IX, the relevant
interpretation of similar language in Title VI, and the administrative
and legislative interpretations of Title IX since the statute's original
enactment all lead to the same conclusion: that Title IX coverage for
an institution of higher education is appropriate if federal monies are
received by or benefit the entire institution.
Id. at 599 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
8 Id. at 571.
19 Id. at 573.
20 Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 910 (M.D. La. 1996)
(indicating that as a result of the Bell decision "[flew athletic departments were impacted
by Title IX . . . as few were the direct recipients of federal funds"); see Wendy Olson,
Beyond Title IX: An Agenda for Women and Sports in the 1990's, 3 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 105, 113 (1990) (characterizing the decision in Grove City as a "major blow"
to Title IX because most athletic departments do not directly receive federal funding);
Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U.
MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 32 (1992) (noting that after the Grove City decision,
athletic programs and departments did not "receive" federal funding within the meaning
of Title IX).
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Thus, the decision in Grove City severely altered Title IX's
effectiveness in combatting sex discrimination in intercollegiate
athletics.2" Because college and university athletic departments were
no longer bound by Title IX, they began to cut back on women's
intercollegiate programs and continued to expand men's programs.22
Leaders in women's sports began to claim that schools used the Grove
City decision as an excuse to ignore the letter and spirit of Title IX. 23
In addition, the United States Department of Education terminated
seventy-nine ongoing Title IX cases because it knew it could not
prevail.24
In response to the Grove City decision, Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 ("Restoration Act"). 25 The
Restoration Act restored the broad scope of Title IX, 26 making it clear
that the language "program or activity" must be broadly construed and
should have institution-wide application.27 The Restoration Act states
"the term[s] 'program or activity' and 'program' mean all of the
operations of . . . a college, university, or other post-secondary
institution, or a public system of higher education . . any part of
which is extended Federal financial assistance. ,,28 Consequently, if
21 Lamar, supra note 2, at 256 (characterizing the Grove City decision as "crippling"
to Title IX and commenting that "[tihe effects of the Supreme Court's narrow
interpretation of Title IX was to harm many women's programs and, for a time, halt the
move towards equity").
22 Olson, supra note 20, at 114; P. Michael Villabos, The Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987." Revitalization of Title IX, 1 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 149, 151 (1990). For
example, in 1986, soon after Southwest Texas State University moved the football team
to Division I-AA it dropped its successful women's gymnastics program. Olson, supra
note 20, at 114.
23 Villabos, supra note 22, at 151.
24 Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 894 n.5 (1st Cir. 1993).
25 Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994)).
26 Cohen, 991 F.2d at 894 (noting that "[tihe Restoration Act required that if any arm
of an educational institution received federal funds, the institution as a whole must
comply with Title IX's provisions.").
27 See 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994). The legislative history clearly indicates that
Congress intended to restore the institution-wide approach to Title IX. Id. In passing
the Restoration Act, Congress stated: "legislative action is necessary to restore the prior
consistent and long-standing executive branch interpretation and broad, institution-wide
application of those laws as previously administered." S.REP. NO. 64, at 4 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 6.
2' 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1994).
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any branch of a college or university receives federal financial
assistance, the whole school is bound by Title IX. 29
After the passage of the Restoration Act, the amount of Title
IX cases increased substantially.3" Because Title IX does not
specifically discuss athletics,3' the courts have had to look elsewhere
for guidance in analyzing the onslaught of claims.32 That guidance
has come primarily from the regulations promulgated to ensure
compliance with Title IX.33
B. Title IX Regulatory Scheme
Prior to amending Title IX to effectuate its broad purposes,
Congress directed the Department of Education ("DED"), through its
Office for Civil Rights ("OCR"), 34 to promulgate regulations to ensure
I d.; Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 982-83 (D. R.I. 1992) (holding
that because Brown University receives federal financial assistance, the University as a
whole, including the athletic department, is subject to Title IX), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st
Cir. 1993).
3 Catherine Pieronek, A Clash of Titans: College Football v. Title IX, 20 J.C. &
U.L. 351, 357 (1994) (noting that "[s]ince Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1987, interest has grown in filing gender equity lawsuits. At least eleven suits
were filed in 1992 and the early part of 1993, each an attempt to force a university to
better accommodate its women athletes."); see also Stellmach, supra note 7, at 207
(commenting that the Restoration Act was a "catalyst for change" and stating that soon
after its enactment, "sixteen complaints were brought alleging discrimination in athletic
departments of twelve colleges and universities").
" See 20 U.S.C § 1687 (1994).
32 See Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 983-84. The court looks to regulations that were
promulgated for athletic programs and are codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c), (addressing
the proper apportionment of scholarship money based on the number of students of each
sex who participate in athletic programs), and § 106.41 (regulating "any interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural" athletic program). Id.
31 See 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979) (codified at 34 C.F.R. §§. 106.37(c) and
106.41(a)-(c)).
14 The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW"), the predecessor
agency of the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights, was the agency
originally directed by Congress to promulgate regulations implementing Title IX. Cohen
v. Brown University, 879 F. Supp. 185, 194-95 n.23 (D. R.I. 1995). However, after
a split in HEW, the successor agency, OCR, adopted regulations identical to those
promulgated by HEW. Id. Thus, this Note will refer to OCR as the promulgating
agency of the Title IX regulations.
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compliance and ease enforcement of the statute. 35  The OCR is the
federal agency that monitors implementation of Title IX. 36 In 1979,
31 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs and Activities
Receiving or Benefitting from Federal Financial Assistance, 34 C.F.R. § 106 (1994).
Intercollegiate athletics are addressed at 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c) (athletic scholarships) and
§ 106.41(a)-(c).
Section 106.41(a) states:
No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, be treated differently from another
person or otherwise be discriminated against in any interscholastic,
intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered by a recipient, and
no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately on such basis.
Id. Section 106.41(c), entitled Equal Opportunity, states:
A recipient which operates or sponsors interscholastic, intercollegiate,
club or intramural athletics shall provide equal athletic opportunity
for members of both sexes. In determining whether equal
opportunities are available the director will consider, among other
factors:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition
effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of members of
both sexes;
(2) The provision and maintenance of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice times;
(4) Travel and per diem expenses;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training services and facilities;
(9) Provision of housing and dining services and facilities; and
(10) Publicity.
See also infra text accompanying notes 42-43.
36 See OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS: REQUIREMENTS UNDER TITLE IX OF
THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at1; VARGYAS, supra note 9, at 6.
In the past year, the OCR has been instrumental in assisting schools with Title IX
compliance. GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS REPORT, THE NCAA REG., Aug. 31, 1994
[hereinafter NCAA REG.]. Texas Tech University has agreed to add a women's varsity
soccer team this fall and another women's team next year. Id. Also, Texas Tech will
attempt to bring the percentage of female athletes within five percentage points of total
enrollment. Id. At California State University, the OCR has made a settlement with the
school that provides that the University will add women's teams, cut men's teams and
improve the quality of facilities and equipment provided for the female athletes. /d; In
addition, San Jose State made an agreement with the OCR that it will add four women's
teams in the next four years in order to add female participation in the intercollegiate
athletic program that equals the 50/50 enrollment percentage of men to women in the
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after promulgating the regulations, the OCR37 issued its Policy
Interpretation38 to resolve confusion regarding Title IX compliance. 9
"[Tihis policy interpretation provides a means to asses an institution's
compliance with the equal opportunity requirements of the regulations
which are set forth at 45 CFR 86.37(c) and 89.41(c)." 40 Specifically,
the purpose of the Policy Interpretation is "to provide a framework
within which complaints can be resolved, and to provide institutions
of higher education with additional guidance on the requirements for
compliance with Title IX in intercollegiate athletic programs.",41 The
Policy Interpretation is divided into three compliance areas: (1)
Athletic Financial Assistance; (2) Equivalence in Other Athletic
Benefits and Opportunities; and (3) Effective Accommodation of
Student Interests and Abilities.42 The first area treats the athletic
scholarship aspects of Title IX and will not be discussed in this Note.
The second and third compliance areas incorporate the ten factors
listed in the regulations which should be examined to determine
whether there is discrimination at an institution under Title IX.43 The
factors are:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of
school. Id.
3' The Policy Interpretation was originally promulgated by the HEW which was the
predecessor agency of the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights. Cohen,
879 F. Supp. at 194-95 n.23. The OCR, through the DED "adopted the very same
regulation which the Policy Interpretation was issued to interpret." Id. This Note will
refer to the OCR as the promulgating agency of the Policy Interpretation.
38 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; a Policy Interpretation; Title IX
and Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979) [hereinafter Policy
Interpretation].
31 See id. (explaining that by 1978, approximately one hundred complaints alleging
Title IX violations in the area of athletics had been received and that consequently the
Policy Interpretation was issued both to aid investigations and provide guidance to
universities on how to comply with the law).
'0 Id. at 71,415. The Policy Interpretation, unlike the regulations, does not have the
force of law. Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 910 n.45 (M.D. La.
1996).
41 Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,413.
42 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,415-18.
43 Id. at 71,414-15 (incorporating the factors set out in 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1)-
(10)).
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competition effectively accommodate the interests and
abilities of members of both sexes;
(2) Provision and maintenance of equipment and
supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice times;
(4) Travel and per diem expenses;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic
tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation of coaches and
tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and
competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training services and
facilities;
(9) Provision of housing and dining services and
facilities; and
(10) Publicity."
However, these considerations are not exhaustive. The regulations
permit other factors to be considered to determine whether equivalent
benefits and opportunities are being provided. 45 The third compliance
area focuses on the first of the ten factors listed above-whether
colleges and universities are effectively accommodating the athletic
interests and abilities of their students.4 6
The final development in the complicated Title IX regulatory
scheme occurred in 1990 when the OCR issued its Investigator's
Manual.47 The Manual, like the Policy Interpretation,48 is divided
"Id. (codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)).
41 Id. In fact, the Policy Interpretation adds (1) recruitment of student athletes, and,
(2) support services to the factors to be considered to determine compliance with Title
IX. Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,417.
' See Susan M. Shook, Note, Title IX Tug-Of-War and Intercollegiate Athletes in the
1990's: Nonrevenue Men's Teams Join Women Athletes In The Scramble for Survival,
71 IND. L.J. 773, 777 (1996). For a full discussion of this aspect of Title IX, see infra
Parts III and IV.
47 VALERIE M. BONNETTE & LAMAR DANIEL, OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, TITLE IX ATHLETICS INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL (April
1990) [hereinafter INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL]. The purpose of the Investigator's Manual
is to assist the OCR in investigating compliance with Title IX by institutions of higher
35519971
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into three areas: (1) athletic scholarships;49 (2) accommodation of
athletic interests and abilities;5" and (3) other athletic benefits and
opportunities.5 '
This Note specifically examines claims made under the equal
opportunity provisions of Title IX which are contained in the
"effective accommodation" sections of the Policy Interpretation and
Investigator's Manual. 2 As stated, virtually all cases53 adjudicating
claims made under these provisions have been resolved by focusing
on the first of the ten factors listed in the regulations 4 and included
in the Policy Interpretation.55 Accordingly, this Note focuses on the
effective accommodation provision which has been central to judicial
resolution of equal opportunity claims brought under Title IX.56  To
establish a claim under the effective accommodation of athletic
education. Id. at Introduction.
's See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
41 INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 47, at 7. The regulations governing athletic
scholarships are codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c) and contained in the Policy
Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,415.
50 INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 47, at 7. The regulations governing
effective accommodation of athletic interests and abilities are codified at 34 C.F.R. §
106.41(a)-(c) and contained in the Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,417.
"' INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 47, at 7. The regulations governing Other
Athletic Benefits and Opportunities are codified at 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(2)-(10) (dealing
with recruitment of and support services for intercollegiate student athletes) and are
contained in the Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,415.
" The equal opportunity provisions of Title IX appear in the implementing
regulations at 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1)-(10) and in the Policy Interpretation, supra note
38, at 71,417.
s See, e.g., Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated
as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.
R.I. 1992), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F.
Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993), mot. to modify order denied, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993);
Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part sub norm, Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
' The first of the ten factors listed in the regulations is "[w]hether the selection of
sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of
members of both sexes." 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1).
s Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,418.
See Robert C. Farrell, Title IX or College Football?, 32 Hous. L. REv. 993,
1013-14 (Winter 1995) (observing that the three benchmarks of the effective
accommodation provisions "have become the focus of Title IX litigation").
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interests and abilities provision, there is a three-part analysis which
is also contained in the Policy Interpretation.57 This test inquires:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation
opportunities for male and female students are
provided in numbers substantially proportionate to
their respective enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are
under-represented among intercollegiate athletes,
whether the institution can show a history and
continuing practice of program expansion which is
demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and
abilities of the members of that sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are
under-represented among intercollegiate athletics, and
the institution cannot show a continuing practice of
program expansion such as that cited above, whether
it can be demonstrated that the interests and abilities
of the members of that sex have been fully and
effectively accommodated by the present program.58
University compliance with the three-part effective accommodation
test has been the central focus of the courts which have struggled to
resolve Title IX equal opportunity compliance claims. 9
57 Id.
8
.d. Schools may determine the "interests and abilities" of their students by any
nondiscriminatory method of their choosing, provided that:
(a) The processes take into account the nationally increasing levels of
women's interests and abilities;
(b) The methods of determining interest and ability do not
disadvantage the members of an under-represented sex;
(c) The methods of determining ability take into account team
performance records; and
(d) The methods are responsive to the expressed interests of students
capable of intercollegiate competition who are members of an
under-represented sex.
Id.
9 Thro & Snow, supra note 2, at 618; see also sources cited supra note 53.
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III. Case History Under Title IX Regulations
Although the Title IX regulations and Policy Interpretations
were designed to clarify university obligations under the statute, by
1988 there had been very few judicial pronouncements analyzing Title
IX claims brought by intercollegiate athletes. 6° This was mostly due
to the Supreme Court's 1984 Grove City decision which effectively
eliminated Title IX as a tool to establish gender equity in
intercollegiate athletic departments.6" Since the 1987 Restoration Act
however, Title IX litigation has substantially increased.62 Resulting
from the five leading decisions brought by female intercollegiate
student athletes,63 the standards as of 1996 have become much clearer
since the Policy Interpretation was first issued in 1979. This part of
the Note will analyze the cases which have provided much of the
guiding interpretation of the regulations and conclude by synthesizing
the current status of the three-part effective accommodation test.
With the exception of Cook v. Colgate University,' each case
involved a class of female plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief for
reinstatement of their varsity teams which had either been demoted or
eliminated. 65 Each of the universities claimed the cutbacks were for
financial reasons.66 In each case, the court relied heavily on the
60 Although Title IX litigation has recently increased, even by 1996, "only a handful
of cases have interpreted Title IX." Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp.
892, 911 (M.D. La. 1996).
6 See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
62 See Pieronek, supra note 30.
13 See infra text accompanying notes 64-172.
6 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992). Cook is unique among Title IX cases in that
the Court applied a burden-shifting approach borrowed from the jurisprudence which has
developed around Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2002-17
(1994), rather than the three-part effective accommodation test contained in the Policy
Interpretation. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 41 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Texas
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252 (1981); see also infra notes
61-156.
65 See Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 978; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 578; Roberts, 814 F.
Supp. at 1507. For a full discussion of these cases, see infra Part II.B-D.
6 See Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 981-82; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584-85; Roberts, 814
F. Supp. at 1510-11, 1518.
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Policy Interpretation and the Investigator's Manual to apply Title IX. 67
Finally, each court after Cook used the three-part
effective accommodation test as the central evaluation of Title IX
compliance.68
A. Cook v. Colgate University
One of the first cases filed after the passage of the Restoration
Act was Cook v. Colgate University.69 In Cook, female members of
the women's hockey club team sued the school to attain varsity
status." The plaintiffs contended that the school's denial of varsity
status violated Title IX. 71 The plaintiffs brought suit on their own
behalf and did not certify a class.72
The Court began its analysis by noting that under Title IX,
there does not have to be a showing of specific intent to discriminate
by the plaintiff.73 The Court then applied a three step burden shifting
analysis74 and held that to establish a prima facie violation, the
plaintiffs would have to prove that Colgate University had not
67 See Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 982-84; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 579-80; Roberts, 814
F. Supp. at 1514; Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 915-17.
' Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 912-16; Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 982-84; Favia, 812 F.
Supp. at 584; Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1510-11; see Jill K. Johnson, Title IX and
Intercollegiate Athletics: Current Judicial Interpretation of the Standards for Compliance,
74 B.U. L. REV. 553, 570 (1994); Pieronek, supra note 30, at 354.
69802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
70 Id. The women had previously applied for varsity status three times. Id. at 740.
71 Id. at 741.
72 Cook, 992 F.2d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993).
13 Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 741 (citing Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517,
539-40 (E.D. Pa. 1987)).
74 Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 743:
[T]he plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination
... . [T]hen the burden shifts to the defendant to come forward
with evidence of some legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its
conduct . . . . [Tlhen the plaintiffs, in order to prevail, must show
that the reasons advanced by the defendant are pretextual or a
coverup for a discriminatory decision.
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provided them with equal opportunities." The plaintiffs introduced,
evidence in six of the ten areas listed in the Policy Interpretation that
illustrated the differences between the men's and women's hockey
teams.76 The most alarming disparity was that the men's team
received fifty times the amount of financial support from Colgate than
the women's team. 77 The district court quickly rejected Colgate's six
justifications for the disparity7" and directed Colgate to elevate the
women's hockey team to varsity status.79
On appeal, the Second Circuit signaled the significance of
choosing proper plaintiffs in Title IX equal opportunity litigation.80
Rejecting the plaintiff's argument that the circumstances were
"capable of repetition, yet evading review" and thus an exception to
the mootness doctrine, the Court vacated the decision of the district
court on mootness grounds." It reasoned that all of the named
plaintiffs had either graduated, or planned to do so, prior to the year
in which Colgate was required to elevate the hockey team. 2-
Therefore, no decision by the court could effect their rights as against.
the university. 3
Furthermore, in the absence of a class action suit, the
exception to the mootness doctrine applies only when "(1) the
challenged action [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated
prior to its cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party would be subjected to the
same action again. '"84 Since there was no evidence that Colgate
7 Id. at 743. To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiffs must show "(1) that the
athletic department at Colgate is subject to the provisions of Title IX; (2) that they are
entitled to the protection of Title IX; and (3) that they have not been provided "equal
athletic opportunities." Id. at 733.
76 Id. at 744-45. The plaintiffs demonstrated disparities in'expenditures, equipment,
locker room facilities, travel, practice times, and coaching. Id.
'7Id. at 744.
78 Id. at 746-50.
71 Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 751.
80 See generally Stellmach, supra note 7, at 212 (discussing the Cook decision and
its lessons for choosing proper plaintiffs in Title IX suits).
8" Cook, 992 F.2d 17, 19 (2d. Cir. 1993).
82 Id.
83 id.
I d. (internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original).
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University's policies would again effect the plaintiffs, after they
graduated, the exception was held not to apply."
Although the district court's decision in Cook is not
demonstrative of the "effective accommodation test," 6 the court's
analysis is useful because the court discusses the ten factors listed in
the Policy Interpretation" and demonstrates their usefulness in
resolving Title IX claims. Additionally, the court of appeals' decision
regarding mootness highlights an important procedural practice point
for Title IX litigation in the future.
B. Cohen v. Brown University
The leading equal opportunity case applying the Policy
Interpretation is Cohen v. Brown University.88 The analysis of the
Court in Cohen is more consistent with the method set forth in the
Policy Interpretation. 9 Here, the Court analyzed the specifics of the
history of Title IX and its guidelines' and afforded great weight to
the Title IX regulations.9" The district court then set forth a detailed
analysis of whether Brown University ("Brown") passed the three-part
s Id. at 20.
6 See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text; VARGYAS, supra note 9, at 25
(observing that the district court's opinion in Cook "diverged from the Policy
Interpretation both by inserting a treatment analysis into what should have been viewed
as a straight participation claim and by compounding the problem with a sport-specific
analysis.., which does not comport with the Policy Interpretation's focus on program-
wide discrimination").
87 Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 744-45.
809 F. Supp. at 978.
'9 See VARGYAS, supra note 9, at 25; Pieronek, supra note 30, at 356.
o Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 982-84.
9' Id. at 988. The court stated:
[Tihe Policy Interpretation, and to a slightly lesser extent the
Investigator's Manual, are important guides in unraveling the
requirements of the athletic regulation. Moreover, considerable
weight should be given to an agency's interpretation of its own
regulation . . . . In addition, given the paucity of caselaw in this
area, both parties rely heavily upon the Policy Interpretation and the
Investigator's Manual to support their respective arguments.
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effective accommodation test and found that it did not.92
Brought on behalf of all present and future Brown University
female students, Cohen v. Brown Univ. was a class action suit.9 3 The
named plaintiffs, members of the women's gymnastics and volleyball
teams,94 sued the school alleging that the recent demotion of the two
teams from varsity to club status violated Title IX.95 The plaintiffs
alleged that the demotion of the two women's teams had exacerbated
Brown's already discriminatory treatment of women.96 The plaintiffs
sought a preliminary injunction:
(1) reinstating the women's gymnastics and volleyball
teams to full varsity status; and (2) prohibiting Brown
from eliminating or reducing the status of any other
Brown-funded women's intercollegiate athletic teams
unless the percentage of "opportunities" to participate
in intercollegiate athletics equals the percentage of
women enrolled in the undergraduate program.97
As previously mentioned, the Cohen Court looked to the
three-part effective accommodation test to determine the outcome of
the litigation.9" The first part of the test, whether the ratio of
intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and female
athletes is "substantially proportionate"" to their respective
enrollments, was decided in favor of the plaintiffs."° Brown had
fifteen women's varsity teams and sixteen men's varsity teams.' °
However, the plaintiffs claimed that the relative number of teams did
92 Id. at 990-94.
91 Id. at 979.
94 Id.
" Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 979. Two men's teams, varsity golf and water polo, were
simultaneously demoted to club status. Id.
' Id. at 980. The Court held that Brown had continued with its failure to provide
women with equal opportunities to participate in intercollegiate athletics. Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,418.
" Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 991.
'1' Id. at 980.
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not reflect the full story." 2 The percentage of men participating in
varsity sports was 63.4% while the percentage of women's
participation was 36.6%.103 Conversely, the enrollment percentages
were 51.8% men and 48.2% women."°4 As a result of these statistical
disparities, the Court held that Brown did not satisfy the substantial
proportionality test. 05
The second part of the three-part effective accommodation test
is the "program expansion" prong."0 6 Under this test, Brown could
defend itself only if it could show a history and continuing practice
of program expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the
developing interest of women. 07 Brown demonstrated a growth in
women's programs in the 1970's,10' but since that time, "the
intercollegiate athletic program ha[d] remained fairly constant at
approximately 61% men and 39% female." '"19 As a result of the
recent lack of growth, the Court held that Brown also did not meet its
burden under the "program expansion" test."o
Brown also failed the third part of the effective
accommodation test which requires the interests and abilities of
women to be fully and effectively accommodated by the present
programs."' The Court found that Brown had not accommodated the
interests and abilities of women athletes under the existing athletic
program." 2 The demotion of the women's varsity gymnastics and
volleyball teams illustrated the university's failure to accommodate. 1 3
Thus, Brown did not sustain its burden in any part of the effective
accommodation test. 114
102 Id.
'03 Id. at 991.
104 Id.
" Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 991.
106 Id.
107 Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,418.
it Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 991.
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 Id.
"' Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 992-93. Both programs were successful and had existed
as varsity teams for almost twenty years. Id.
"4 Id. at 992.
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The district court found, relying solely on the failure of
Brown to satisfy the effective accommodation test, that the facts were
sufficient to support a Title IX violation." 5 Thus, the court granted
the plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction reinstating both the
women's gymnastics and volleyball teams to varsity status. 116  On
appeal, the First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. 117
In March of 1995, the case was tried to the district court which found
in favor of the plaintiffs." 8
..5 Id. at 994.
116 Id. at 1001.
'i Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
1a Cohen v. Brown University, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D. R.I. 1995), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
The First Circuit held that:
(1) ... ; (2) suit was antidiscrimination claim rather than affirmative
action claim; (3) regulations under Title IX were entitled to
controlling weight and policy issued by the Office for Civil Rights
(OCR) of Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW)
interpreting such regulations was entitled to substantial deference; (4)
donor-funded varsity teams were properly excluded from District
Court's calculation of participation opportunities offered by university;
(5) District Court's interpretation of three-part test of institutional
compliance with participation opportunity requirements of Title IX
was not requirement of numerical proportionality or imposition of
gender-based quota system; (6) Title VII gender discrimination
standards were inapplicable; (7) university's "relative interests"
approach to allocation of athletic resources was not reasonable
interpretation of three-part test; (8) university's allocation of athletic
resources between men's and women's programs based upon "relative
interests" approach failed to accommodate fully and effectively
interests and abilities of under-represented gender; (9) Court would
review constitutionality of District Court's order requiring university
to comply with Title IX by accommodating fully and effectively
athletics interests and abilities of its female students under intermediate
scrutiny test; (10) such order satisfied equal protection requirements;
and (11) District Court was not entitled to reject remedial plan offered
by university and substitute its own specific plan for relief.
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155 (lst Cir. 1996).
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C. Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania
The third case examined is Favia v. Indiana University of
Pennsylvania ("IUP"). n9 The facts of Favia are similar to those of
Cohen. The suit was brought on behalf of all present and future IUP
women students participating in intercollegiate athletics.120 The
named plaintiffs were members of the recently eliminated women's
gymnastics and field hockey teams.1 21 In evaluating the plaintiffs'
claim, the district court gave the Policy Interpretation "great
deference. "122 As in Cohen, the Court used the effective
accommodation test to assess whether IUP complied with the duty to
provide equal opportunities to women participating in intercollegiate
athletics. 123  First, the Court applied the substantial proportionality
test, differing only slightly from Cohen in its procedural
application.'24 It first found that IUP did not provide women students
with opportunities to participate in intercollegiate athletics
proportionate to the amount of women enrolled in the school.125
Before the cuts, 37.8% of students participating in intercollegiate
athletics were women and 56% of total students enrolled were
women. 12 6 After the elimination of the gymnastics and field hockey
teams, women's participation fell to 36.5 %.127 Therefore, as a result
of the disproportionate statistical disparity, the Court concluded that
IUP did not pass the substantial proportionality test. 128
IUP was also unable to pass the second prong of the effective
,, 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993).
120 Id. at 579.,
"' Id. at 579-80. In addition to the elimination of the women's teams, IUP also
eliminated the men's varsity soccer and tennis teams. Id. at 580.
122 Id. at 584.
123 Id.
124 Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584. The court noted that a plaintiff is only required to
prove the first prong, that athletic opportunities are not being offered to women athletes
in substantial proportionality to their respective enrollments, then the burden shifts to the
defendant to comply with either the second or third prongs. Id.
125 id.
'26 Id. at 584-85.
127 Id. at 585.
128 Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584.
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accommodation test.' 29 IUP could not demonstrate that it had a
history of expanding its athletic opportunities to respond to the
increasing interest of its women students. 3 The district court found
that the school's promise to promote the women's club soccer team
to varsity status in the future was not sufficient to meet the program
expansion test. 3 ' Thus, IUP did not sustain its burden in the second
part of the test.'32
Finally, IUP also failed to sustain its burden on the third
prong of the effective accommodation test.'33 IUP did not show that
it fully and effectively accommodated the interests and abilities of its
women students.' 34 The named plaintiffs demonstrated their own
commitment to sports by bringing the action. 135 In addition, both the
gymnastics and field hockey teams had quality competition.' 36  On
this evidence, the court found that IUP did not satisfy the third part
of the test.' 37 Ultimately, the district court granted the plaintiffs'
request for a preliminary injunction to reinstate both the women's
gymnastics team and the women's field hockey team and to prohibit
IUP from eliminating any more women's teams.'38
129 Id. at 584-85.
130 Id. at 585.
"' Id. (commenting that "[y]ou can't replace programs with promises").
132 Id.
133 Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 585.
134 id.
135 id.
136 id.
137 Id.
"' Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 579; see id. at 585 (stating that "[i]n summary, the women
plaintiffs merely seek what the law requires, equal athletic opportunities"). After this
decision, IUP automatically moved to modify the injunction. Favia, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir.
1993). The district court denied the motion. Id. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed
the denial. Id.
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D. Roberts v. Colorado State University
The next case to be examined is Roberts v. Colorado State
University ("CSU").' 39 In this case, former members of the women's
varsity softball team sought reinstatement by CSU of their team which
had been terminated in June 1992."4 The district court used the
three-part effective accommodation test to assess the program at
CSU.1
4 1
The district court found that CSU's intercollegiate program
did not satisfy the first part of the test. 142  Subsequent to the
elimination of the women's softball team, the percentage of women
participating in intercollegiate sports was 37.7%, whereas the
percentage of women enrolled at CSU was 48.2%. 143 The district
court interpreted the Investigator's Manual'"4 and the Cohen145
decision to find that a 10.6% disparity did not satisfy the substantial
proportionality test. 146
CSU also failed the program expansion test. 147 The district
court examined the school's policy over the last twelve years and
stated that, "CSU must either demonstrate actual expansion in
women's athletic programming or establish that it has considered and
improved upon the under-represented status of women athletes when
reductions in athletic programs became necessary in the past.""'
'3 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom,
Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
1" Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1509. CSU had eliminated both the women's softball
team and the men's baseball team beginning with the 1993 season. Id. at 1514.
141 Id. at 1511. The court affirmed that a Title IX violation may be premised solely
upon a failure to comply with the effective accommodation test (codified at 34 C.F.R.
§106.41(c)(1)). Id.
142 Id. at 1513.
143 Id. at 1512.
'" INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 47.
141 Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 978.
" Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1512-13 (commenting that "a disparity between female
athletic participation and female undergraduate enrollment of 10.6% is not acceptable
under Title IX absent a showing by defendants under the second or third prong of the
Effective Accommodation test").
147 Id. at 1514.
148 Id.
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CSU failed to take the inequities into consideration when it was
necessary to make cutbacks.' 49 Thus, the efforts of CSU did not
satisfy the program expansion test.
Finally, CSU did not satisfy the third part of the effective
accommodation test. 50 CSU failed to show that the interests and
abilities of the women at CSU were being fully accommodated by the
present athletic program.' The evidence presented illustrated the
dedication of the women on the softball team,' 52 the success of their
former team, 53 and the growing popularity of softball nationwide.' 54
In addition, the Court examined evidence of the skill and interest of
women athletes in general at CSU'55 and found that CSU did not
make a full and effective effort to accommodate those interests and
abilities. 56  Therefore, CSU failed the last part of the effective
accommodation test.' 57 After finding that CSU failed all three
portions of the effective accommodations test, the Court found that
the termination of the women's softball team violated Title IX, and
ordered a permanent injunction for its reinstatement.158
'49Id. The court cited as an example a showing that since the 1980-1981 season,
four women's varsity teams had been eliminated. On the other hand, despite the
inequalities that already existed, only three men's teams were eliminated during the same
time period. Id.
"o Id. at 1516.
"'1 Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1516.
... Id. at 1517. Testimony by two women athletes regarding "their dedication to the
sport of softball, the amount of time they had invested throughout their lives in training
for this sport, and tangible losses they are experiencing in not being able to play softball
during the current academic year," was consistent with other testimony and affidavits
submitted by plaintiffs in support of establishing that there was a significant interest in
intercollegiate women's softball. Id.
' Id. CSU's women's softball team finished third in its conference in 1992. Id.
I5 d. Testimony indicated a 236% increase of Colorado high school girls
participating in softball; the high percentage of those who go on to attend CSU; and the
fact that women's fast-pitch softball will be a medal sport in the 1996 Summer Olympics.
Id.
1 Id. at 1517-18. The court was especially impressed with the showing of women
interested in soccer, lacrosse, rugby, volleyball, and skiing as evidenced by the popular
club teams in those sports. Id.
" Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1517-18.
17 Id. at 1518.
I"/d. at 1518-19.
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E. Pederson v. Louisiana State University
The Title IX trend continued when, on January 12, 1996, the
latest equal opportunity decision was rendered in Pederson v.
Louisiana State University ("LSU"). '5 9 Differing from Cohen, Favia,
and Roberts in its application of the three-part effective
accommodation test, Pederson broke new ground in equal opportunity
litigation under Title IX. 160
Through the lawsuit brought by a class of female students16 1
at Louisiana State University, the plaintiffs alleged that the school
violated Title IX by not effectively accommodating its women
athletes. '62 The plaintiffs sought, among other things, an affirmative
injunction ordering the university to create a women's fast-pitch
softball team. 163  Resolution of the claim required application of the
three-part effective accommodation test.
The Court started its analysis by broadly rejecting the Cohen,
159 912 F. Supp. 892 (M.D. La. 1996).
"6 Pederson is unique in its application of the three-part effective accommodation
test. See infra notes 166-70 and accompanying text. It is also unique because it was the
first case where the courts had to decide whether a university failed the third prong
(requiring full and effective accommodation of interests and abilities) when plaintiffs
brought suit for failing to create a team despite sufficient interest and ability. Id. See
Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 911 (indicating that these claims were unique because of the
lack of guidance within this area of jurisprudence), Johnson, supra note 68, at 583
(noting that "[i]t remains an open question whether the courts will be convinced of
sufficient interest and ability in situations in which women sue their universities for
failing to create a team or [to] provide equitable participation opportunities. No case of
this ilk has been reported.").
The Policy Interpretation indicates that "institutions are not required to upgrade
teams to intercollegiate status or otherwise develop intercollegiate sports absent a
reasonable expectation that intercollegiate competition in that sport Will be available
within the institution's competitive regions." Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at
71,418.
161 The original Pederson plaintiffs were not varsity athletes at the university.
Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 901 n.18. After consolidation with another suit which
involved plaintiffs who had both eligibility to play varsity athletics and an expressed
interest in playing women's softball at LSU, the Court held that the plaintiffs had
standing to bring an equal opportunity claim under Title IX. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at
901 n.18.
162 Id. at 900-01.
163 Id. at 897. The claims based upon ineffective accommodation of women's
interests in soccer were found to be moot. Id. at 897-900, 905-06.
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Favia, and Roberts approaches to the three-part test." According to
the Court, those decisions placed an intolerable degree of emphasis
on the first prong-requiring substantial proportionality between
women's athletic opportunities and their enrollment percentages.
65
Rather, a substantial disproportionality is only evidence of sex
discrimination to be considered in totality with evidence related to the
second and third prongs. 66
After clarifying its approach to substantial proportionality, the
court found that the enrollment percentages at LSU were 51 % male
and 49% female, while the athletic participation rates were 71 % male
and 29% female-a 20% disparity. 67 Next, the Court considered the
third prong and found that sufficient interest and ability in women's
softball existed,'68 and that the absence of a women's softball team at
LSU indicated its failure to effectively accommodate the present
interests and abilities. 69
In finding a sufficient interest and ability in women's softball,
the Court accepted the plaintiffs' evidence that sufficient interest and
ability existed in 1979 when LSU previously had a team, 7 ° and that
since then, interest and participation had increased regionally and
nationally.' 7' At this point in the analysis, the Court observed that the
substantial disproportionality between the female enrollment and
participation figures combined with LSU's failure to accommodate
women's interests and abilities, "suggests that sex discrimination
accounts for the discrepancies. "172
Finally, the Court applied the second prong, inquiring whether
LSU could "demonstrate a history and continuing practice of program
164 Id. at 913-14.
163 Id. The court reasoned that "the jurisprudential emphasis on numerical
'proportionality' is not found within the statute or the regulations .... " Id. at 914.
According to the court, the proportionality statistics should be considered as evidence of
sex discrimination and not proof of it. Id.
16 Id. at 914, 916.
167 Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 915.
168 Id. at 915-16.
'69 Id. at 916.
70 The team was eliminated from the women's athletic program in 1983 without
"credible evidence of the reason for that decision." Id. at 915.
171 Id. at 916-17.
' Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 916.
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expansion." 17 3 Refusing to decide whether a university could avoid
Title IX liability by a successful showing under that prong,174 the
Court found that LSU did not provide credible evidence of such a
history and continuing practice. Other than an unfulfilled promise in
1993 to add two varsity women's sports teams, LSU's history showed
that in the previous fourteen years, no new women's teams had been
added and one team had been eliminated.' 75 Accordingly, the Court
found LSU to be in violation of Title IX and ordered the university
"immediately to effectively accommodate LSU's female population
pursuant to Title IX or to submit an adequate plan for such
compliance .... 176
F. Current Judicial Interpretation of the Effective
Accommodation Test
The decisions in Cohen, Favia, Roberts and Pederson
establish guidelines on how the three-part effective accommodation
test will be applied in future litigation.1 77 First, the vast majority of
courts, following the clear language of the three-part test on this
point, have held that a defendant university will comply with Title IX
173 id.
' The Court noted in this regard:
Under the Policy Interpretation, an educational institution which is
proved not to be effectively accommodating the interests and abilities
of the under-represented sex but is able to demonstrate a history and
continuing practice of program expansion demonstrably responsive to
the developing interests and abilities of the under-represented sex
may still be found to be in compliance with Title IX.
Assuming-without addressing the wisdom of allowing a university
to avoid a finding of non-compliance when, as a matter of fact, non-
compliance has been proved-that this element of the analysis is
incorporated herein, this Court finds that LSU has not provided
credible evidence of such a history and practice.
Id.
175 id.
176Id. at 922.
77Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 991-94; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584-85; Roberts, 814 F.
Supp. at 1511-18.
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if it satisfies any one of the three prongs.' 78 , The Pederson Court's
totality approach is unique in this respect.
However, as illustrated, the courts have not provided precise
guidance on the required enrollment and participation statistics
necessary to meet the substantial proportionality part of the test.'79
The courts have found that percentage differences ranging from
10.5 %x80 to 19.1%181 are not substantially proportionate,, yet have not
indicated the statistical showing which is required by the substantial
proportionality prong of the three-part test.'82 One court has observed
that "substantial proportionality is properly found only where the
institution's intercollegiate athletic program mirrors the student
enrollment as closely as possibly."'83 In fact, no reported decision
has yet found an institution where there has been substantial
proportionality between female enrollment and female participation in
178 See, e.g., Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 743; Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 200; Favia, 812
F. Supp. at 584; Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1511. But see Pederson 912 F. Supp. at
913-15 (rejecting view that a university may comply with Title IX by meeting the
substantial proportionality prong while not complying with the other prongs).
179 Vargyas, supra note 9, at 17; see also Farrell, supra note 56, at 1040 (recognizing
that "[t]he mathematics of proportionality is not yet clearly defined"); Johnson, supra
note 68, at 581-82 (stating that "additional litigation will undoubtedly continue to refine
the definition of substantial proportionality").
's Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1512-13 (holding that the 10.5% disparity was not
substantially proportionate).
181 See Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584-85 (holding that the 19.1% disparity failed to
provide women athletes with opportunities substantially proportionate to the percentage
of women students enrolled); Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 991 (holding that an 11.6%
disparity was not substantially proportionate), aff'd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993)
Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 915 (suggesting that a 20% disparity is not substantially
proportionate).
12 The district court in Roberts indicated in dicta that a statistical difference of 1.7%
would meet the substantial proportionality benchmark by characterizing the percentage
as "acceptable." Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1518. The OCR has provided strict guidance
on substantial proportionality to its investigators. INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL, supra note
47, at 24 (indicating that "if the enrollment is 52% male and 48% female, then, ideally,
about 52% of the participants in the athletics program should be male and 48% female
183 Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 201-02 (D. R.I. 1995). The Court
indicated that although substantial proportionality is "an elusive concept,". since a
successful showing on prong one will insulate an institution from Title IX liability, it
"must be a standard stringent enough to effectuate the purposes of the statute." Id.
1997] TITLE IX 373
intercollegiate varsity, sports. 14 Finally, it is clear that the burden is
on the plaintiff to establish non-compliance with substantial
proportionality.' 85
. If a university is shown to fail the first part of the test, it may
show that it has "a history and continuing practice of program
expansion which is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest
and abilities of the members of [the under-represented] sex."1 86 Only
Pederson has shown a reluctance to apply this prong as a defense to
Title IX liability.' 87 The burden of proof for this prong of the test
rests with the university.1 8 In addition, this prong is increasingly
difficult to satisfy when a women's varsity team is recently cut from
the-university's athletic program.'8 9
The cases have made clear that a university may not
demonstrate sufficient program expansion under this prong simply by
eliminating men's teams thereby increasing the proportionate number
of women involved in intercollegiate athletics."' ° Rather, to show
's See also VARGYAS, supra note 9, at 17; Jeffrey P. Ferrier, Comment, Title IX
Leaves Some Athletes Asking "Can We Play Too?, " 44 CATH. U. L. REV., 841, 868
(Spring 1995). The lowest statistical differential which has been recognized by a court
as substantially disproportionate is 7.5%. Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830; Melody Harris,
Hitting 'Em Where It Hurts: Using Title IX Litigation to Bring Gender Equity to Athletics,
72 DENV. L. REV. 57, 83-84 (1994). According to Deborah Brake, staff attorney for
the National Women's Law Center, "courts generally accept a difference of 5 percent or
less." Eric Olson, Passing .Title IX Test is Tough on Colleges, OMAHA WORLD HERALD,
April 30, 1995, at IC.
185 See Roberts, 814 F. Supp. at 1511; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584; Cohen, 809 F.
Supp. at 992.
' Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,418. The function of the second
benchmark is to give schools "the opportunity to reach gender equity at a reasonable
pace," recognizing that they "are not required to achieve full equality overnight." Harris,
supra note 184, at 88. This purpose has been criticized, however, on the ground that
Title IX is over twenty years old and the transition period for schools moving toward
compliance has long since lapsed. Farrell, supra note 56, at 1043-44.
187 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
188 The language of the Policy Interpretation places the burden of proof on the
university: "whether the institution can show a history and continuing practice of program
expansion." Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,418; see Cohen, 991 F.2d at
901-02; Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 584; Roberts, 998 F.2d at 831.
'9 Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1514-15 (D. Colo. 1993),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998
F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
"g Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 207; Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830.
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expansion, universities must actually increase the number of women's
teams or individual opportunities to satisfy this prong. 9' Program
expansion cannot be shown by "improvements" to women's programs
which do not increase participation rates.'92 Additionally, the
program expansion must be continuous, not sporadic, and should
reflect recent changes made by the university.'93 Finally, mere
promises to expand women's athletic opportunities in the future will
not be deemed a sufficient program expansion.' 94 In no reported case
has a university successfully defended a Title IX suit based upon this
benchmark.' 95
Where a plaintiff demonstrates that a university provides
women athletes with opportunities substantially disproportional to
their enrollment percentages, and a university cannot show sufficient
program expansion, the university may nonetheless comply with Title
IX if it is fully and effectively accommodating the interests and
abilities of the members of the under-represented sex.'96
The courts are split on whether the plaintiff or defendant has
.91 See Roberts, 998 F.2d at 830 (explaining that "the ordinary meaning of the word
,expansion' may not be twisted to find compliance under this prong when schools have
increased the relative percentages of women participating in athletics by making cuts in
both men's and women's programs"); Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 991 (explaining that the
Policy Interpretation links program expansion "to the number of teams and athletes
participating in intercollegiate competition").
92 See, e.g., Cohen, 809 F. Supp. at 991 (rejecting Brown University's argument
that "expansion" could be shown by a consistent increase in the number and quality of
coaches).
93 See Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 916-17 (holding that with the exception of a recent
unfulfilled promise to add two new teams, the previous fourteen year failure to expand
women's opportunities was not a sufficient history and continuing practice of program
expansion); Cohen, 991 F.2d at 903 (observing that program expansion occurring the
1970's would not be sufficient where no expansion has taken place since); Roberts, 814
F. Supp. at 1514 (noting that the addition of 11 women's sports in the 1970's could not
constitute a sufficient continuing practice of program expansion through 1993); Harris,
supra note 184, at 89 (stating that in "evaluating the history and continuing practice of
program expansion, courts also must look at the number of women's athletic teams
recently added...").
"9 See Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 585; Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 916; see also supra
text accompanying notes 130-132.
195 See Farrell, supra note 56, at 1044.
196 Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,418.
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the burden of proof on this prong,'97 which inquires whether "there
is [an] unmet need in the under-represented gender that rises to a
level sufficient to warrant a new team or the upgrading of an existing
team."' 98  A significant limitation on the requirement that schools
upgrade or create new teams in order to comply with Title IX is
contained in the Policy Interpretation: "... institutions are not required
to upgrade teams to intercollegiate status or otherwise develop
intercollegiate sports absent a reasonable expectation that
intercollegiate competition in that sport will be available within the
institution's competitive regions. ' 9
Furthermore, in determining whether it is necessary to create
or upgrade teams, schools must first determine the interests and
abilities of its students, "taking into account the nationally increasing
levels of women's interests and abilities. "2" The Court in Pederson
provided significant guidance on how this can be achieved. Included
among the permissible methods are: student requests, levels of
participation in club and intramural sports, student questionnaires,
interviews, and contacting amateur athletic associations.2 °'
While the courts have made clear that the creation of a new
team or the upgrading of an existing team may satisfy Title IX,2°2
until 1996, no court had addressed whether a university would fail
this portion of the test if women sued a school for not creating a team
where sufficient interest and ability existed.2"3 The decision in
Pederson clearly showed that such a theory is available, and can be
197 See Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 208 (placing burden on plaintiff to prove non-
compliance); Favia, 812 F. Supp at 584 (placing burden on defendant to prove
compliance); Roberts, 814 F. Supp at 1516 (placing burden on defendant to prove
compliance).
198 Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 208 (quoting Cohen, 991 F.2d at 900).
'9 Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,418.
2oo Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,417; see supra note 58.
20' Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 915 n.61.
202 See, e.g., Cohen, 879 F. Supp. at 211-12; see also Policy Interpretation, supra
note 38, at 71,418 (discussing the relevance of "upgrading the competitive opportunities
available to the historically disadvantaged sex as warranted by developing abilities among
the athletes of that sex").
' See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 68, at 583. "It remains an open question whether
the courts will be convinced of sufficient interest and ability in situations in which women
sue their universities for failing to create a team or provide equitable participation
opportunities. No case of this ilk has been reported." (emphasis in original). Id.
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successful to Title IX plaintiffs. Finally, it is clear that financial
constraints will not excuse the failure to comply with Title IX under
any of the three prongs. 204
IV. Effects of the Equal Opportunity Cases
As a result of the developing Title IX case law and the success
of women athletes who have brought Title IX claims,2 °5 universities
have become uneasy about the threat of litigation at their own
schools.2°6 This trend has been bolstered by the 1992 Supreme Court
decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools 2°7 which made
monetary and punitive damages available for intentional violations of
Title IX. 218  Consequently, many universities have been forced to
comply with Title IX in the face of possible lawsuits. 29 At the same
time, a few institutions have voluntarily established gender equity
committees which monitor university compliance with Title IX in
order to avoid possible violations of the statute. 21  These responsible
programs recognize both Title IX's legal significance and the greater
educational values which Title IX seeks to promote through
204 Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 583 '(stating that "Title IX does not provide for any
exception to its requirements simply because of a school's financial difficulties."); Cook,
802 F. Supp. at 750 (observing that under Title IX, "[ilt is-clear that financial concerns
alone, cannot justify gender discrimination") (quoting Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F.
Supp. 517, 530 (E.D. Pa. 1987)), vacated as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
205 See Williams, supra note 5, at 646 (observing that Title IX suits brought by
women athletes "have met with near universal success"); Andrew Blum, Athletics in the
Court, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, at 1, 30 (quoting Arthur Bryant, Executive Director
of Trial Lawyers for Public Justice as saying that universities have no valid defense to
many Title IX claims made against them and are losing in court); Laurie Tarkan,
Unequal Opportunity, WOMEN'S SPORTS AND FITNESS, Sept. 1995, at 26 (indicating a
"steady flow of lawsuits from women" and noting that since 1988, there have been thirty-
one successful suits without a single loss).
206 Blum, supra note 205, at 30.
207 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
208 Id.
209 See Henderson, supra note 5, at 143 (indicating that many universities would
rather spend resources to "eradicate discriminatory practices" rather than to pay legal fees
defending a Title IX suit).
220 See, e.g., infra Part IV.A-B.
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intercollegiate athletic competition.2 ' This part will review some of
the more progressive plans recently implemented by select universities
and will follow with a discussion of the recent success brought by
threatened Title IX litigation.212
A. The University of Iowa Plan
In what has been described as taking a "leadership role in the
quest for equity in athletics," 1 3 the University of Iowa ("Iowa")
athletic control board pledged to provide athletic opportunities to its
varsity women athletes in proportion to their undergraduate
enrollment percentages by 1997.214 The plan is consistent with the
commonly held belief that reallocating existing resources is one of the
best methods of achieving gender equity in fiscal crises. 1 5
In order to reach its goal of providing equitable athletic
opportunities, Iowa has proposed, among other things:
2. Plac[ing] a cap on squad sizes for men's
sports, creating a significant difference in the
participation ratio... ;
5. Increas[ing] the current number of scholarships
permitted in women's sports. Realistically, 30
scholarships could be added to the women's programs.
This would mean, 157 scholarships for men (54.1 %)
and 133 scholarships for women (45.9%);
6. Addling] soccer to the women's program giving
them 17 scholarships. Men's scholarships would
remain constant at 157 (51.1%) but women's
scholarships would increase to 150 (48.9%);
21 See infra notes 219-20, 242 and accompanying text.
212 For a discussion of the effects of threatened litigation by coaches of women's
intercollegiate athletic teams seeking equal pay, see infra notes 415-23 and accompanying
text.
113 Lamar, supra note 2, at 267 (quoting letter from Christine Grant at the University
of Iowa).
214 Id. at 267; Henderson, supra note 5, at 154 n. 123.
25 Henderson, supra note 5, at 151.
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7. Consider[ing] adding a second sport with seven
scholarships, resulting in 157 scholarships for men
(50%) and 157 scholarships for women (50%)."6
Iowa's progressive plan to increase scholarships and to consider
adding new women's varsity teams are not the only methods available
to universities attempting to provide equal athletic opportunities.
B. The Big Ten Approach
A plan proposed by the Big Ten Task Force on Gender
Equity, and adopted by The Big Ten, (Big Ten Approach)2"7 is
expected to utilize five different methods to reach its goal of gender
equity. The Big Ten Approach "require[s] a 60-40% male-female
participation level in athletics by June of 1997 and a ratio comparable
to the undergraduate enrollment ratio of each institution by 2002. "218
To reach that goal, the Big Ten Commissioner anticipates the
following methods will be used:
1. Conduct a campaign to encourage women to join
athletic teams even if they do not receive an athletic
scholarship... ;
2. Identify women's sports on each campus that can
be upgraded from club status to intercollegiate
competition;
3. Establish limits on the sizes of men's teams, with
reductions of 10 percent or more, depending on the
size required by the needs of each sport... ;
4. Identify the sports that hold the greatest appeal for
female athletes, such as basketball and volleyball, and
create junior varsity teams; [and]
116 Lamar, supra note 2, at 267-68.
27 Id. at 265. The "Big Ten" is a conference of 11 large midwestern universities;
see also Rodney K. Smith, Wien Ignorance Is Not Bliss: In Search of Racial And
Gender Equity In Intercollegiate Athletics, 61 Mo. L. REV. 329, 389 (1996).
2,8 Lamar, supra note 2, at 265-66.
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5. Eliminate [some] men's teams.219
Recognizing both the moral22° and educational imperatives of gender
equality in athletics, the Big Ten Approach is "not an attempt to get
in compliance, [rather it is] an attempt to live within what we think
is the right thing to do," according to the Commissioner.22' Two
other organizations, The Southeastern Conference and the NCAA
have adopted similar proposals.222 Unfortunately, not all universities
have recognized that there is more to the gender equity issue than
Title IX's legal requirements. Ignoring the valuable educational
aspects of athletics,223 many universities have been unwilling to
voluntarily restructure their athletic departments to comply with Title
Ix.
C. Recent Achievements Through Threatened Litigation
Frequently, universities have slowly moved toward gender
equity only at the threat of Title IX lawsuits. For example, in a case
which has been described as "a watershed moment in college athletics
for women,"224 Auburn University ("Auburn") agreed to settle a Title
2"9 Malcolm Moran, Campus Changes Coming, Like it or Not, N.Y. TIMES, June 22,
1992, at C1. For a discussion of other schools' approaches to gender equity, see Lamar,
supra note 2, at 269-72.
220 See Douglas Lederman, Men Get 70% of Money Available for Athletic
Scholarships at Colleges that Play Big-Time Sports, New Study Finds, CHRON. OF
HIGHER ED., Mar. 18, 1992, at A45 (quoting Richard Schultz, executive director of the
NCAA, recognizing that gender equity "is more than a financial issue, it's a moral issue
as well").
221 Moran, supra note 219, at C2.
222 The Southeastern Conference requires its member schools to offer, at a minimum,
two more women's teams than men's teams. See Moves on Equity, WASH. POST, June
4, 1993, at B2. In addition, the plan requires each SEC school to offer at least three
women's team sports. Id.; B. Glenn George, Who Plays and Who Pays.: Defining
Equality in Intercollegiate Athletics, 1995 Wis. L. REV. 647, 662 (1995). The 1993
NCAA Convention adopted a new certification requirement that its member institutions
develop plans on how to approach gender equity and conduct self-studies to ensure
compliance with Title IX. See id. at 661.
See infra note 242 and accompanying text.
24 Nick Charles, The Battle of the Sexes, Part I - Title IX at Auburn, CNN, May 29,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCRIPT File.
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IX lawsuit filed by female student athletes rather than face court
scrutiny of its football program.225 The settlement required the
university to establish a soccer program for women athletes by 1993
and contribute a $400,000 budget during the first two years.226 The
Auburn settlement marked the first time that a new women's sports
program was created in response to the threat of Title IX litigation. 2 7
It also sparked a new trend in the pursuit of equal opportunity at
institutions across the country.
In 1993, more significant settlements were reached after
plaintiffs threatened to bring suit under Title IX. At the University
of Texas ("Texas"), for instance, seven women soccer athletes
brought suit against the university alleging that it was violating Title
IX by not providing equal athletic opportunities to its women
athletes.22 The university agreed to a settlement which required it to
add new women's soccer and softball teams, 2 9 and to raise the level
of women's athletic opportunities to within three percent of the
percentage of women in the undergraduate enrollment.2 3°
In addition, two 1993 developments at California institutions
were inspired by the desire to avoid litigating Title IX lawsuits.
First, in August, having previously announced the elimination of the
women's varsity gymnastics team, the University of California at Los
Angeles ("UCLA"), reinstated the team after a former UCLA
gymnast planned to challenge the action under Title IX.231 Canceling
its plans to eliminate the team was preferable to litigating "a
225 Pieronek, supra note 30, at 373.
226 Charles, supra note 224. Auburn also agreed to pay damages and legal fees as
part of the settlement. Id.
227 Id.
228 See Pieronek, supra note 30, at 374; Nick Charles, The Battle of the Sexes, Part
5 - Progress Report, CNN, May 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCRIPT
File.
229 Charles, supra note 228.
230 University of Texas is required to provide the female student body (currently at
47%) 44% of its athletic opportunities by 1995-96. David Baron, Settlement by UT
Could Spawn Title IX Lawsuits, Hous. CHRON., July 17, 1993, at 1C. Female
participation in varsity sports will increase from 23% to 44%. Carol Herwig, Texas
Case Advances Gender equity Quest, USA TODAY, July 19, 1993, at 8C.
23' NCAA REG., supra note 36, at 8; Jane Gottesman, Gymnastics Rescued at UCLA,
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 21, 1993, at F2.
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potentially expensive Title IX lawsuit. 232  Then, in October, the
California State University system agreed to settle a Title IX suit
brought by California's National Organization for Women alleging
that the university was not in compliance with the proportionality
prong of the three-part effective accommodation test. 233  As part of
the settlement, the California State University system agreed to bring
the level of women's athletic opportunities within five percent of the
percentage of women in the student body by 1998-99.234
The threat of lawsuits has also caused the reinstatement of the
women's varsity tennis team at the University of New Hampshire, 235
the women's varsity lacrosse, volleyball and tennis teams at the
University of Massachusetts, 236 and the women's varsity lacrosse and
softball teams at Virginia Polytechnic Institute.237
On the other hand, Title IX litigation does not always have a
positive effect on women's sports. 38 For example, in February 1992,
the Office for Civil Rights found that Brooklyn College failed to
provide equitable treatment of women athletes in the ten areas listed
in the Policy Interpretation.23 9 When faced with a possible lawsuit
amidst a budget crisis, 24' Brooklyn College decided to eliminate the
232 Gottesman, supra note 231, at F2.
23 Robert Fachet, Women's Sports Strengthened in California, WASH. POST, Oct. 23,
1993, at G2.
z Id.
235 Blum, supra note 205, at 30.
2M Id.
237 Deborah Brake & Elizabeth Catlin, The Path Of Most Resistance; The Long Road
Toward Gender Equity In Intercollegiate Athletics, 3 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 51,
67 (1996). In addition, in 1991, during the NCAA women's basketball tournament, both
the University of Oklahoma and William and Mary College eliminated their women's
basketball programs. Heckman, supra note 20, at 52. However, both universities
reinstated these programs when threatened with the possibility of litigation. Id.
238 Rather than comply with Title IX, Brooklyn College chose to eliminate its athletic
department. Teresa M. Miguel, Title IX and Gender Equity In Intercollegiate Athletics;
Case Analysis, Legal Implications, and the Movement Toward Compliance, 1 SPORTS
LAW J. 279, 300 (1994).
239 Id.
24 Brooklyn College was forced to eliminate its athletic program following a
requirement by New York State to cut their operating budget for the 1992-93 academic
year. Id.
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entire athletic department rather than try to comply with Title IX.
241
This solution hurt both male and female athletes and did not further
the purpose of Title IX regulation which is to ensure equal
opportunities to collegiate athletics.242
It is unclear whether universities will continue to require their
women athletes to seek equal opportunity in court rather than in the
athletic department. If Title IX is to achieve its goals, the educational
value of athletics must be recognized. Universities must view Title
IX as more than just a legal requirement. Rather, they must realize
that the importance of the statute lies in its assurance that the skills,
self-confidence, leadership and "lifelong healthy attitude" '243 which
comes from athletic competition, be available equally to all regardless
of gender.
V. Equal Pay for Coaches in Intercollegiate Athletics
In addition to increasing the number of cases regarding gender
equity of students involved in intercollegiate varsity athletics, Title IX
has also sparked a number of recent lawsuits by coaches of women's
athletic teams against their universities seeking pay equal to their
men's team counterparts. 244 Coaches of women's athletic teams have
also sought to eliminate discriminatory pay under the Equal Pay Act
of 1963.245 Although equal pay cases by coaches against universities
241 Id. Title IX does not require universities to provide any athletic opportunities to
their students. Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 905 (M.D. La.
1996); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 214 (D. R.I. 1995), aff'd 991 F.2d
888 (1st Cir. 1993). However, if a university does provide athletic opportunities they
must be provided on an equal basis. Pederson, 912 F. Supp. at 905; Cohen, 879 F.
Supp. at 214.
242 Miguel, supra note 238, at 300.
243 Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 583 (W.D. Pa. 1993).
Christine Brennan & Gabby Richards, Women Taking to the Courts; Title IX
Inaction Now Costing Schools, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 1993, at F1 (quoting Kathryn
Reith, Assistant Executive Director of the Women's Sports Foundation, noting that "the
lawsuits are starting to add up. "); Darryl Richards, Coach's Equality Pursuit Gives Peers
Hope, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 15, 1993, at 10B (observing that "[n]ationwide,
eight cases are on court dockets").
25 Pub. L. No. 88-38, § 3, 77 Stat. 56 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994)).
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have not become a trend, they have recently increased.246  Beyond
actually bringing suits, the threat of litigation has
also induced many universities to equalize the salaries of women's
and men's team coaches. Regardless of the number of cases filed,
equal compensation for men's and women's varsity coaches has
become a very hot issue under both Title IX and the Equal Pay Act.247
A. Equal Pay Act Litigation
The leading case brought by a female intercollegiate athletic
coach seeking pay equity is Stanley v. University of Southern
California ("USC"). 248  Marianne Stanley was hired as the head
women's basketball coach at USC on July 30, 1989.249 Her contract
lasted four years and provided for a yearly base salary of $60,000 and
an additional $6000 for housing." ° In the spring of 1993, Coach
Stanley and the athletic director at USC, Michael Garrett, began
negotiations for renewal of her contract.251 Coach Stanley told
246 Brennan & Richards, supra note 244, at Fl.
247 See Janis Carr, Equal Work But Not Necessarily Equal Pay; Salaries: The Gap
Between Men's and Women's Coaches is Closing. Still, the Latter Remains Behind,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr.. 3, 1994, at C12 (reporting that Tim Stoner, Chief Counsel
for the Women's Basketball Coaches Association has observed that the equity in pay issue
has moved to the "forefront of the athletic directors' consciences"). The federal laws
written to end gender-based discrimination include: Title IX of the Education Amendment
of 1972; Title VII of the Civil rights Act of 1964; and the Equal Pay Act. Id.
24' 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir. 1994).
"Of all the issues that have confronted us, this is the most serious
that has come along in a long time, said Betty Jaynes, the
Executive Director of the Women's Basketball Coaches
Association. This is not the University of Southern California and
Marianne Stanley. This is the University of Southern California
and the coaches of women's basketball." Malcolm Moran,
Colleges; Dispute Over Equality Leaves a Coach Jobless, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 1993, at Bll.
249 Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1316.
M5Oid.
251 id.
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Garrett that she deserved to receive the same amount of pay that the
school paid George Raveling, the head coach of the men's varsity
basketball team.252 At that time, Coach Raveling was paid $150,000
a year. 253 Garrett agreed that she should have a comparable salary to
that of Coach Raveling, but stated that at that time USC did not have
the money to pay her.254
A few weeks later Garrett returned with a new offer for
Coach Stanley.255 This time, it was a three year contract which would
have increased her salary to $80,000 in 1993-1994, $90,000 in 1994-
1995, and $100,000 in 1995-1996 with a $6000 a year housing
allowance.256 Coach Stanley rejected this offer and reasserted her
desire for a multi-year contract for the same pay as Coach
Raveling. 257 At this time, Coach Stanley claimed that Garrett became
hostile and ceased negotiating in good faith. 258 After counter-offers
from both sides, 25 9 Garrett made a final offer of a one year contract
for $96,000.260  He gave Coach Stanley one day to make her
decision.26' On August 5, 1993, Coach Stanley filed suit in the
Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles. 262  Her complaint
252 Id. Coach Stanley also requested that her assistant coaches be paid a higher
salary. Id.
253 United States Supreme Court Justice Refuses To Order Reinstatement of Former
USC Women's Basketball Coach Pending Trial On Sex Discrimination Claim, ENT. L.
REP., Aug. 1994, at Vol. 16, No. 3.
' Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1316.
255 Id.
256 id.
17 Id. Mr. Garrett claimed that Coach Stanley demanded a "three year contract
which would pay her a total compensation at the annual rate of $96,000 for the first 18
months and then increase her total compensation to the same level as Raveling for the last
18 months." Id. at 1316-17. Mr. Garrett said he rejected this offer. Id. at 1317.
258 Id. at 1317.
29 Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1317. Coach Stanley asserts that Mr. Garrett then offered her
a one year deal for $90,000. Id. Mr. Garrett alleges that Coach Stanley requested a deal
similar to the one originally offered to her, but that this request included free room and
board for Coach Stanley's daughter at USC, more media coverage for her team, and
bonuses related to the success of the, team. Id.
260 id.
26 Id. Coach Stanley requested more time to consider her decision, but Mr. Garrett
refused. Id.
'26 Id. at 1318.
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alleged a violation of the Equal Pay Act as well as various state sex
discrimination claims and common law causes of action.263 Coach
Stanley made an ex parte request for a temporary restraining order to
reinstate her as head coach after her contract was not renewed,
pending a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction.2" The
following day, the Los Angeles Superior Court judge issued the
temporary restraining order,265 and USC removed the action to the
District Court for the Central District of California.266 Three weeks
later, the district court held a hearing on Coach Stanley's motion for
the preliminary injunction which it denied.267 Coach Stanley then
appealed to the Ninth Circuit.268
The central thrust of Coach Stanley's claim was that under the
Equal Pay Act of 1963,269 she should receive pay equal to that of
Coach Raveling due to the-substantial similarity of their respective
coaching positions. 270 The Equal Pay Act states:
[n]o employer having employees subject to any
provisions of this section shall discriminate, within
any establishment in which such employees are
employed, between employees on the basis of sex by
paying wages to employees in such establishment for
equal work on jobs the performance of which requires
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are
performed under similar working conditions.... 271
263 Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1318. No violation of Title IX was asserted. Id.
6 id.,
11 Id. Under the temporary restraining order, USC was ordered to pay Coach
Stanley $96,000 a year and she would also continue to receive the same benefits that she
had under her original contract. Id.
266 id.
267 Id. at 1318-19.
I Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1319.
'6 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994).
270 Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1319; see also infra notes 278-83 and accompanying text.
271 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1994). To state a claim of wage discrimination on the
basis of sex under the Equal Pay Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the jobs being
compared are substantially equal in terms of skill, effort, responsibility and working
conditions. Id.; Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1321.
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The Ninth Circuit first noted that in order for Coach Stanley
to prevail on her motion for a mandatory preliminary injunction she
must clearly show a probability of success on the merits. 272 The court
held that she did not meet that burden because the job and
qualifications of Coach Raveling seemed to differ greatly than the job
and qualifications of Coach Stanley .273 For example, coach Raveling
was required to participate in many public relations and promotional
activities.274 In contrast, the Court found that Coach Stanley did not
engage in any of these activities to the level that Coach Raveling
did.27' In addition, Coach Raveling had "substantially different
qualifications and experience related to his public relations and
revenue generation skills than Coach Stanley." 276  He had been a
basketball coach for thirty-one years, had trained and worked in the
marketing field for nine years, wrote two novels, appeared in a movie
and had appeared on national television to discuss recruiting. 277
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit found that Coach Raveling had added
pressure to win and to promote his team because his men's team
generated a much greater amount of revenue than the women's
team.278
In response, Coach Stanley asserted that she was also under
great pressure to win.279 She claimed that her team did generate
revenue,28 ° although she conceded that it was not a job requirement.281
In addition, Coach Stanley argued that she had won four national
12, Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1320 (stating that "to obtain a preliminary injunction, Coach
Stanley was required to demonstrate that her remedy at law was inadequate").
273 Id.
274 Id. at 1321. These activities included twelve outside speaking engagements a
year, interviews and other endorsements. Id. These activities helped to generate revenue
90 times greater than the women's team generated. Id. For a discussion of these factors
in the Title IX context, see infra Part V.A.3.
27 Id. at 1321-22.
276 Id. at 1321.
' Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1322.
21 Id. at 1321-22 (stating that "[t]he responsibility to produce a large amount of
revenue is evidence of a substantial difference in responsibility."). For a discussion of
these factors in the Title IX context, see infra parts VI.A. 1, 4.
279 Id. at 1322.
"O Id.
281 Id.
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basketball titles and was named Pacific-10 Conference Coach-of-the-
Year in 1993.282 Furthermore, during her employment at USC, the
women's team had gone to the NCAA tournament the past three
years, advancing to the final sixteen teams in 1993 and the final eight
in 1992.283 Finally, Coach Stanley alleged that the difference in
revenue between the men's and women's teams was due primarily to
the different amounts of promotion the two teams receive.28 4
In conclusion, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the
mandatory preliminary injunction because Coach Stanley did not show
that the law and facts clearly favored her position.28 Coach Stanley
then appealed to the United States Supreme Court which denied
certiorari without comment.286 The case never reached trial. Last
year, before the trial on the merits, Stanley lost on summary
judgment. 287  However, because Stanley was one of the premier
coaches in women's basketball, 28 her case has been instrumental in
282 Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1323.
283 Id.
" Id. Coach Stanley claimed that this "caused the enormous differences in spectator
interest and revenue production." Id. But the court found that the differences were
caused by "societal discrimination." Id.
285 Id. at 1326. The Ninth Circuit also rejected Coach Stanley's claim of retaliation.
The court found that she did not clearly demonstrate that Mr. Garrett retaliated against
her because of her demand for equal pay. Id. at 1324.
28 Jack Carey, More Bucks, USA TODAY, Apr. 14, 1994, at IC.
2 Stanley v. University of Southern Cal., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5026 (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 8, 1995) (granting summary judgment in favor of the University).
' Through 1993, in sixteen seasons, Stanley's career record was 351-146. Wendell
Barnhouse, An Uneven Playing Field Women College Basketball Coaches Seek Reform
In Salaries, Contracts, FT. WORTH STAR TELEGRAM, Dec. 17, 1993, at 1. Coach
Stanley has been called "one of the elite coaches in the country." Carr, supra note 247,
at C12. Reporting on her suit, one newspaper commented:
Perhaps no other case in the battle over gender equity has created as
much national attention or struck such a nerve in the world of college
athletics as Stanley's $8 million sex discrimination lawsuit against
USC. Long considered one of the game's top coaches, Stanley was
fired by USC last summer after turning down a one-year contract
offer of $96,000.
Scott M. Reid, What Price Fair? Special Report: Women's Coaching Salaries,
ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 13, 1994, at E7.
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bringing attention to the equal pay issue in intercollegiate coaching.289
B. Title IX Litigation
The leading suit seeking equal pay under Title IX was brought
by a female basketball coach in Bowers v. Baylor University.2"
Coach Bowers was hired as the head coach of the women's varsity
basketball team at Baylor University ("Baylor") in 1979.291 Ten years
later she began to complain about the poor treatment that both she and
her team received as compared to the men's team and their coach.292
Coach Bowers claimed that she did not receive equal treatment
although she was expected to have the same success as the men's
coach. 293
In 1993, Baylor fired Coach Bowers claiming that she was not
operating her program properly.294 Immediately thereafter, Coach
Bowers filed a complaint with both the OCR and the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.295 In response,. Baylor
immediately rehired her.2 96  However, she was notified that to
continue her employment past the 1993-1994 season, she must have
a winning season.297 In March 1994, Coach Bowers was fired
289 See Carr, supra note 247, at C12 (reporting that "the Stanley case has brought the
pay issue to the forefront of the athletic directors' consciences")..
290 862 F. .Supp. 142 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
29M/d. at 143.
292 id.
293 Richards, supra note 244, at 10B. Coach Bowers did not have a full time staff.
Id. For example, student trainers sometimes had to run practice while the coach had to
tend to recruiting duties. Id. Darryl Richards, Sports People: Ex-Baylor Coach's Career
Likely Over After Lawsuit, NEWS TRIB., May 30, 1994, at C2 (noting that "Bowers said
she coached 14 of her 15 seasons at Baylor understaffed and under funded.").
294 Jack McCallum, Paper Trail: Six Coaches Are Among Those Indicted in a Federal
Probe of the Baylor Basketball Program, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 28, 1994, at 48.
295 Bowers, 862 F. Supp. at 143.
296 Id.
297 Id. Baylor athletic director Dick Ellis said that Coach Bowers had ten straight
losing seasons. Id. Additionally, in the 1993-1994 season she had finished in second to
last place in the conference even though the conference player of the year was on her
team. Id. "We had an obligation to the young ladies playing for Baylor to get the best
coach we can provide ... Ellis said of Bowers' 168-257 record at Baylor." Richards,
supra note 293, at C2.
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again."' This time Baylor said that Coach Bowers was fired for not
winning.'"
Coach Bowers brought an action against Baylor University
under Title IX3" seeking a "declaratory judgment that Baylor's
practices were unlawful, a permanent injunction to restrain further
discrimination, a mandatory injunction to reinstate her as Baylor's
head women's basketball coach, back pay and benefits, compensatory
damages of $1 million, and punitive damages in excess of' $3
million. ,301 These allegations stemmed from the disparate allocations
of resources in the men's and women's basketball programs and the
terms and conditions of her employment as compared with the terms
and conditions of employment of the head coach of the men's
basketball team.3°2
Baylor filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, °3
asserting that Title IX did not allow private causes of action for
employees. 3' However, the district court held otherwise. 35  The
district court looked at three Title IX cases306 that had come before
the Supreme Court and found that interpreting the three cases together
9 Bowers, 862 F. Supp. at 143.
299 McCallum, supra note 294, at 48. It is also possible that the firing of Coach
Bowers related to her coming forward about violations of NCAA Regulations and federal
laws committed by the coaches of the men's teams. Id. See Danny Robbins, Baylor
Reaches Settlement with Bowers, Hous. CHRON., Aug. 12, 1995, at 8 [hereinafter Baylor
Reaches Settlement] (reporting that Coach Bowers reported to Baylor officials possible
NCAA rules violations by the men's program). As a result, the head coach of the men's
team, Darrel Johnson was fired. Id. Danny Robbins, News From NCAA All Good For
Baylor; No Penalties Added; Postseason Ban Lifted, Hous. CHRON., Sept. 20, 1995, at
1. The day following the firing, Johnson and three of his former assistant coaches, were
indicted on charges of violating federal mail fraud, wire fraud and conspiracy statutes.
Id. In April, 1995, a jury convicted the three assistants who received probation and
acquitted Johnson. Id.
3 Bowers, 862 F. Supp. at 143.
301 Id.
302 id.
303 Id. at 144.
30 Id..
31 Bowers, 862 F. Supp. at 146.
0 The cases examined were Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979);
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992); North Haven Bd. of Educ.
v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512 (1982).
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resulted in an implied cause of action for Coach Bowers.30 7  I n
Cannon v. University of Chicago,3"' the Supreme Court recognized
that a female student could maintain a private cause of action.3 9 In
the second case, Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,31° the
Supreme Court authorized monetary damages as a remedy.31' Finally,
the Supreme Court ruled in North Haven Board of Education v.
Bell3 12 that the scope of the language of Title IX is broad and that it
can apply to employees.313 As a result of these decisions, the district
court determined that "the Supreme Court would take the next logical
step of recognizing Bowers' cause of action under Title IX. "314
After the district court denied Baylor's motion to dismiss, the
University and Coach Bowers turned to mediation." 5 However, the
mediation failed to resolve the dispute, and the case was scheduled to
be tried and heard in federal court in September of 1995.316 In
August, however, the suit was settled3"7 by an agreed order of
dismissal with prejudice.31 The terms of the settlement were not
disclosed.319
A case in the district court in Washington D.C. involved
Sanya Tyler, the head women's basketball coach at Howard
University, who sued the university under both Title IX and the Equal
3 Bowers, 862 F. Supp. at 144-45.
3 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
'9 Id. at 689.
330 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
311 Id. at 60.
312 465 U.S. 512 (1982).
313 Id. at 512.
314 Bowers, 862 F. Supp. at 145. The district court also found that Coach Bowers
could not bring a claim against the individual defendants because Title IX does not allow
claims against individuals employed by separately incorporated educational institutions.
Id.
315 Jim Molony, Mediation Doesn't Resolve Baylor Case, HOUS. POST, Oct. 15,
1994, at B12.
36 Baylor Settles Bowers Suit, AUSTIN-AMERICAN STATESMAN, Aug. 12, 1995, at
D2.
3 Baylor Reaches Settlement, supra note 299.
338 Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Tex. 1994) (order of dismissal
entered Aug. 11, 1994).
"' Baylor Reaches Settlement, supra note 299.
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Pay Act.32 ° Coach Tyler alleged that her salary, the women's team's
facilities, and the resources allocated to her team were unequal to
those of men's head basketball coach Butch Beard and his team. 2'
Coach Tyler's salary was estimated to be $44,000,322 whereas Coach
Beard's salary was estimated to be $78,000.323 In addition, Coach
Beard received a complimentary car.324 These disparities existed even
though the two coaches had identical job descriptions. 32" As a result
of these disparities, Coach Tyler was awarded $2.4 million by a
jury.12' This case lends a glimmer of hope to all the coaches in
similar situations because it was "the first time a jury awarded
monetary relief in a Title IX athletics case, ' 327 and it demonstrates
that universities will no longer be allowed to discriminate on the basis
of sex.328
VI. A Title IX Approach to the Equal Pay Debate
The debate over whether the head coach of a women's team
should receive pay equal to that of a head coach of a men's team has
recently become paramount.3 29  The issue has been litigated under
both the Equal Pay Act and Title IX, 330 with substantially different
320 Carol Herwig, Equality of Salary Exception, Not Rule, USA TODAY, Jan. 25,
1994, at 8C.
31' Reid, supra note 288, at E7.
322 Julie Deardorff, Equal Pay Slow To Arrive; Women's Coaches Seek Level Field,
CHI. TRIB, Dec. 17, 1993, at 1.
323 Id.
324 Id.
325 id.
326 Richards, supra note 244, at 10B. The award was later reduced to $1.1 million,
and an appeal is now pending on the behalf of Howard University. Id.
327 Deardorff, supra note 322, at 1.
32 Id. (observing that this decision is the first in which a jury has awarded monetary
damages in a Title IX case involving athletics).
329 Wilde, supra note 6, at 217.
33o See supra Part V.A-B.
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standards developing.33' This part of this Note will
discuss the current debate under the standards enunciated by Title IX
and its implementing regulations.
A. Applicability of Title IX to Coaching Salaries
Although the Policy Interpretation provides guidelines on
compliance with Title IX in the payment of coaches' salaries,332 there
is debate centering on whether Title IX's gender equality mandate
applies to the treatment of coaches as well as providing equal
opportunity to athletes.
Some have argued that Title IX requires only that educational
institutions receiving federal funds provide equal opportunities to male
and female athletes, but it does not require coaches be treated
equally.333 One of the most prominent supporters of this view is
University of Georgia athletic director Vince Dooley. Dooley fully
supported the conclusions of a 1994 self-study conducted by the
university which determined that the coaches of women's sports are
paid less than the coaches of men's sports.334 Despite the inequity,
the study concluded that, "[t]his was not considered a violation of
Title IX since the intent of the law is for equal athletic opportunity to
be provided to the participants, not the coaches. "' Despite the
conclusions of the Georgia study, it is clear, however, that Title IX's
gender equality mandate applies equally to both athletes and coaches.
The Policy Interpretation clearly indicates that the provision
and treatment of intercollegiate athletic coaches is covered by Title
IX. "Assignment and compensation of coaches . ." is one of the ten
331 While the Equal Pay Act cases have, for example, focused largely on revenue
generation to determine whether coaching positions are substantially similar, see, e.g.,
Stanley, 13 F.3d at 1322; Hodgson v. Robert Hall Clothes, 473 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866 (1973); Williams, supra note 5, at 657-58 (indicating that
suits brought under the Equal Pay Act are difficult to win where the men's team produces
more revenue), the Title IX regulations indicate that revenue generation is irrelevant. See
infra notes 345-47 and accompanying text.
332 See infra notes 336-39 and accompanying text.
... See supra note 331 and accompanying text.
114 See Reid, supra note 288, at El.
335 id.
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factors listed in the Policy Interpretation to determine whether
discrimination exists in intercollegiate athletics.336 While the
"assignment" of coaches relates to whether student athletes are
receiving equal opportunities,337 the "compensation" of coaches
inquiry is designed to determine whether intercollegiate coaches are
receiving equal treatment, consistent with Title IX. 38  Among the
factors examined to determine whether institutions are in compliance
with Title IX regarding the compensation of coaches are:
(a) Rate of compensation (per sport, per season);
(b) Duration of contracts;
(c) Conditions relating to contract renewal;
(d) Experience;
(e) Nature of coaching duties performed;
(f) Working conditions; and
(g) Other terms and conditions of employment.339
Although the Policy Interpretation considers these seven factors in its
determination of university compliance, much of the equal pay debate
has focused on only five factors.34 ° This sub-part will discuss the
most controversial elements which have served as the foundation of
the equal pay debate.
S1.Rate of Compensation for Coaches
The disparity in compensation in terms of base salary between
the coaches of women's teams and the coaches of men's teams is
immense. In fact, the average base salary for a coach of a women's
athletic team ($44,961) is just fifty-nine percent of the average base
336 Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,416 (codified at 34 C.F.R. §
86.41(c)(6)).
337 id.
338 Id.
139 Id. at 71,417.
31 See discussion infra Part VI.A.1-4. The provisions regarding conditions relating
to contract renewal and experience have not received much attention.
394 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIII
salary for a coach of a mens athletic team ($76,566)."4' A 1994 study
by the Women's Basketball Coaches Association ("WBCA") found
that in Division I basketball, eighty-eight percent of the men's coaches
received at least $60,000 compared to just thirty-two percent of
women's team coaches.342 Despite these differences, there are those
who are opposed to equalizing the pay of women's and men's team
coaches. Their argument primarily relies on revenue generation as
the justification for disparate coaching salaries. Thus, the coach of
a team that generates a large amount of revenue should be
compensated accordingly.343 According to this view, the jobs are not
the same because the market is not the same.344 For example, Chris
Voelz, the athletic director at the University of Minnesota, asserts that
the job of a coach of a men's team is not equal to the coach of a
women's team because the coaches of the men's teams are under
345greater pressure to produce revenue.
However, Title IX should not be interpreted to permit
discrimination in base salaries on the basis of generating revenue.346
The Policy Interpretation states that "Title IX requires that an
institution of higher education must comply with the prohibition
against sex discrimination . . . in the administration of any revenue
producing intercollegiate athletic activity." The OCR has thus
indicated team revenues are not relevant in determining compliance
with Title IX.347 In addition, while the Equal Pay Act and Title VII,
34, Herwig, supra note 320, at 8C.
342 Tom Witosky, High Salaries for Coaches Make College Athletes Want Pay,
GANNET NEWS SERV., Apr. 11, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, WIRES File.
313 See, e.g., Nick Charles, The Battle Of The Sexes, Pt. 4 - Lawsuit at USC, CNN,
Jan. 9, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCRIPT File (quoting a spokesperson
from USC).
31 See, e.g., Brennan & Richards, supra note 244, at Fl.
... Betty Cuniberti, Women Deserve Men's Pay, KAN. CITY STAR, Sept. 3, 1994, at
DI.
3 Tara Sullivan, Separate But Equal? Women's College Basketball, Coaching? Yes!,
NEWSDAY, Mar. 13, 1994, at 26.
141 Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,421 (internal quotation marks omitted);
see B. Glenn George, Miles to Go and Promises to Keep: A Case Study in Title IX, 64
U. COLO. L. REV. 555, 568 (1993) (indicating that OCR rejected public comments which
sought to exempt revenue producing sports from the requirements of Title IX); see also
Wilde, supra note 3, at 225 n.47 (indicating that many amendments introduced in
Congress to exempt revenue-generating sports from Title IX have all been defeated).
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which also prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex, contain the
"factor other than sex" defense which considers revenue generation
in defense of liability, Congress' failure to include that defense in
Title IX indicates that revenue generation should not be considered in
determining whether an institution's disparate payment for coaches of
athletic teams is in violation of Title IX. 348
Further, the amount of revenue a team generates should not
be determinative of the pay of the coach349 because in some sports,
such as men's basketball, revenue is generated regardless of the
identity of the coach. 351 In addition, even in non-revenue generating
sports, coaches of men's teams earn more than the coaches of
women's teams.35" ' For example, the average salary of a men's golf
coach is $27,772, whereas the average salary of a women's golf
coach is $22,672.352 In these instances, it is clear that the degree of
generated revenue cannot justify paying the women's coach less than
the men's coach.
Finally, the total income received by coaches of men's
programs is likely to exceed the income received by coaches of
women's programs.353 In addition to the base salaries received by all
coaches, coaches of men's programs also receive income from a
variety of other sources, such as sportswear contracts, 35 summer
348 Williams, supra note 5, at 681.
3 Mark Trumbull, National Survey Points Up Inequities In College Sports,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 15, 1994, at 15.
"o Sullivan, supra note 346, at 26; Witosky, supra note 342 (quoting Christine
Grant, women's athletic director at the University of Iowa as saying "[tihe coach can do
little more than produce a well-coached team that will be competitive .... Attendance
has less to do with a particular coach than it has to [do] with the public's acceptance of
the sport. ").
.31 Cuniberti, supra note 345, at DI.
352 Id.
313 Brennan & Richards, supra note 244, at Fl; see Witosky, supra note 342
(reporting that according to a 1994 Women's Basketball Coaches Association study, 9%
of women's basketball coaches supplemented their base salaries with radio programs and
7% from television, while 48% of men's coaches had radio show contracts and 45% had
television contracts); see, e.g., Carr, supra note 247, at C12 (comparing $125,000 per
year radio and television contract of Tennessee's men's basketball coach with the $20,000
package of the women's basketball coach).
" Reid, supra note 288, at El.
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basketball cam ps , and
participation in radio 356 or television shows.357  These additional
financial incentives have had a direct effect on women's programs.35
One result of the disproportionate income between coaches of men's
and women's programs is that the better coaches will be attracted to
positions in the men's programs regardless of the coach's gender.359
The incentive for coaches to obtain employment in men's programs,
rather than in women's programs, further illustrates the need for
parity in salaries of coaches in men's and women's athleticprograms. 36
2. Duration and Types of Contracts
In addition to compensation, the Policy Interpretation also
measures compliance with Title IX by considering "the equivalence
for men's and women's coaches of ... [the d]uration of contracts. "361
The discrepancy between the length and types of contracts for
women's coaches compared to men's coaches "is still a big issue,"
according to Jim Foster, past president of the WBCA.36 2
According to Timothy Stoner, counsel for the WBCA, many
coaches of women's teams operate without formal contracts.363 It's
been found that three-fourths of the Division I women's basketball
coaches work under informal contracts which can be terminated on as
355 Id.
356 Id.
357 Id.
358 Id.
... See Barbara A. McDonald, Note, Equal Pay for Coaches of Female Teams:
Finding A Cause of Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 751, 753-54
(1980); Reid, supra note 288, at E6.
31 McDonald, supra note 359, at 753-54.
361 Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,417.
362 Julie Deardorff, Making Some Headway in Pay Coaches of Women's Basketball
Teams Fight for Equal Salaries, DES MOINES REG., Dec. 19, 1993, at 7.
363 id.
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little as three months notice. 3" These informal "letters of
appointment" and short-term contracts do not provide an equivalent
degree of job security36 as the typical long-term contracts in sports,
such as men's football and basketball.366 Women's coaches recognize
the need for equal treatment in the length of contracts because
"[elverybody needs job security so you can build your program." '367
As Nancy Darsch, head coach of the Ohio State women's basketball
team has observed, it is difficult to build a successful program when
recruited student-athletes are unsure whether the coach will be
employed in the following year.368 The difficulty of successful
recruiting is exacerbated by the finding of the NCAA Gender Equity
Study that women athletes receive less than one-fifth of all recruiting
expenses; 369 receiving an average of $28,840 compared to an average
$139,152 for male athletes.37° Thus the disproportionate frequency of
multi-year contracts being granted to the coaches of men's compared
to women's teams creates an increased opportunity for men's
programs to build successful teams. At the same time, short-term and
informal contracts inevitably increase the pressure on women's
coaches to produce winning teams .371 However, since short-term
contracts can actually hinder successful recruiting efforts,372 producing
winning teams becomes even more difficult. Thus, it has been argued
that when it comes to job security, women's coaches have at least as
3" Barnhouse, supra note 288, at 1 (stating that three-fourths of the Division I
women's college basketball coaches work under informal contracts which can be
terminated with as little as one to three month notice).
365 See Deardorff, supra note 362, at 7 (quoting Ohio State's women's basketball
coach Nancy Darsch stating that "[the length of contract issue] is about security, not
necessarily money. It's a reflection of commitment."). See also infra Part VI.A.4.
366 id.
367 Barnhouse, supra note 288, at 1.
11 Deardorff, supra note 362, at 7.
369 See Stellmach, supra note 7, at 207-08 (citing the NCAA Gender Equity Study,
Summary of Results published in 1992).
370 Id. (cited in George, supra note 222, at 661 n.53).
371 Moran, supra note 248, at B17.
372 See supra text accompanying notes 367-70.
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much pressure as the men's coaches to win.373 Yet, pressure to win
has frequently been cited as justification for increased salaries for
men's team coaches. 3
3. Nature of Coaching Duties Performed
In addition to salaries and contracts, the Policy Interpretation,
and much of the current debate on equal pay, considers the nature of
the duties performed by the coaches of men's and women's teams in
order to assess compliance with Title IX.375  Although the Policy
Interpretation states that "the range and nature of duties" may justify
discriminatory salaries between coaches, it goes on to state that
among the factors to consider in determining whether such duties
justify a difference in pay, is "the number of assistant coaches
supervised. ,376
It has frequently been argued that higher salaries for the
coaches of men's teams are justified by the additional activities
required of their job.377 The pressures and duties of promoting,
marketing, and fundraising are among the "additional" activities and
responsibilities which make coaching a men's team different from
women's team coaching, according to this view. 378  This was the
approach taken by the court in Stanley, for example. In rejecting
Stanley's claim under the Equal Pay Act, the Court addressed many
of the men's coach's promotional and marketing activities, as well as
3 See, e.g., Peter Monaghan, A Coach Fears Her Gender-Bias Suit Is Costing Her
Jobs, CHRON. OF HIGHER ED., Feb. 23, 1996, at A43, A44 (quoting Marianne Stanley,
former head coach of the USC women's basketball team as stating that "[in many ways,
the job of a women's basketball coach is much more pressurized and much more difficult
[than coaching a men's team], because you're having to do more with less.").
374 See, e.g., Lisa A. Bireline Sarver, Coaching Contracts Take on the Equal Pay
Act: Can (and Should) Female Coaches Tie the Score?, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV, 885, 915
(1995) (observing that the "nebulous concept of pressure" has been asserted as a
justification for distinguishing between coaching men's and women's basketball teams);
see also infra notes 376-79 and accompanying text.
"I Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,416; see infra notes 376-90.
376 Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,416.
" See infra notes 378-80 and accompanying text.
... See, e.g., Stanley v. University of Southern Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1321-22 (9th
Cir. 1994).
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the pressure to produce revenue379 and concluded "[t]his quantitative
dissimilarity in responsibilities [and pressure] justifies a different level
of pay ... 380
However, these factors may justify a differential in salary
under Title IX only if they are non-discriminatory in nature. 3s' These
duties cannot justify differential salaries if women coaches have been
denied the opportunity to engage in the very activities which are used
to justify greater payment for men's coaches.382
If the coaches of women's teams were given the same opportunities
as the coaches of men's teams to fund-raise, interact with alumni and
really promote their team, they would also be successful in these
activities. 313  As Linda Hill-MacDonald, coach of the women's
basketball team at Minnesota and president of the WBCA has
observed, "men's basketball is marketed and promoted on another
level from [my] team. ,384 Women's coaches have not been given an
equal opportunity to fully become a part of the fundraising and
promotional operation.385 Consequently the additional duties and
responsibilities related to promotions, marketing, and fundraising
cannot be asserted to justify greater salaries for the coaches of men's
379 Id.
38o Id. at 1321.
381 Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,416 (stating that only
"[n]ondiscriminatory factors can affect the compensation of coaches"); see Harris, supra
note 184, at 87 (stating that asserted justifications for otherwise discriminatory conduct
under Title IX should not be accepted if they are themselves discriminatory).
382 See Williams, supra note 5, at 687.
31 Charles, supra note 343.
" Jay Weiner, Justice For All? Voelz, 'U' Coaches May End Up In Court In Salary
Dispute, STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 25, 1994, at IC.
385 Charles, supra note 343; see, e.g., supra note 293 (discussing underfunding and
understaffing of the former Baylor University women's basketball coach). Donna
Lopiano, executive director of the Women's Sports Foundation, explains, "[tihe analogy
is I say we're going to have a fajita cook-off, and the winner gets $50,000. I give the
male cook tortillas, chicken, a pan, and all he needs to put together a great fajita. I give
the woman only half the ingredients. Then I award him the prize because he won. And
that's what's happening out there." Karen Winegar, They Fly Coach; Can Less Be More
For Those Women's Teams?, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Oct. 21, 1994, at 18A.
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teams.386
Moreover, the Policy Interpretation recognizes that additional.
duties and pressures asserted to justify a higher salary may be offset
by a greater number of assistants and support staff.3"7 The NCAA
Gender Equity study has found that men's Division I sports teams
average thirteen assistant coaches compared to just six for women's
teams.38 The same study found that each Division I men's basketball
program spent an average $75,311 for assistants compared to the
$35,477 average spent on women's teams' assistants.
Thus, a women's coach often has a much smaller support
staff, and may have a more difficult job than the coach of a men's
team as a result of the lack of equivalent funding for the women's
teams.39 In describing the many roles of women's coaches, it has
been observed that "[miany have to wear a few hats. They have to
recruit, coach, be an academic advisor [etc]. At men's programs, the
coach just has to coach. That has to do with support staff. "391
Consequently, even though women's coaches are often denied
the opportunity to engage in the kinds of activities which justify pay
differentials, in most instances, their lack of equivalent support staff
316 Many women's coaches would prefer to have the additional duties which result
from successful marketing and promotional operations because as the popularity of
women's sports grows, so does the number of participants. Ailene Voisin, The Explosion
of Women's Athletics, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 1, 1995, at C5. Increased popularity and
participation, .in turn, can be expected to spawn new programs and opportunities for
interested female athletes of all ages which ultimately will improve women's athletic
programs. Id. See also Farrell, supra note 56, at 1049 (commenting that "interest
follows opportunity. Whenever well-organized, well-funded, and well-promoted athletic
opportunities have been made available to women, women's interest in athletics has
flourished. ").
387 See supra notes 375, 386 and accompanying text; see also Williams, supra note
5, at 687 (commenting that under Title IX, added pressure or responsibilities may be
"offset by the availability of additional administrative assistance"). In addition, both the
Equal Pay Act regulations and case law have recognized that a smaller support staff may
offset longer hours or additional job requirements. See, e.g., EEOC v. Madison
Community Unit Sch. Dist., 818 F.2d 577, 583 (7th Cir. 1987) (indicating that while
additional support staff may be viewed as an additional responsibility, it may also be
viewed as a timesaver); 29 C.F.R. § 1620.16(a) (1994).
388 NCAA GENDER EQUITY STUDY (1992), at 6, tbl. 3 [Hereinafter NCAA STUDY].
389 Id. at 7, tbl. 4.
31 Id.; see Monaghan, supra note 373, at A44.
391 Sullivan, supra note 346, at 26.
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offsets any "additional" responsibilities that these activities place on
the men's coaches. As a result Title IX does not permit these factors
to justify differences in coaching salaries.
4. Working Conditions
Closely related to the nature of coaching duties performed, the
conditions under which men's and women's coaches operate has also
been considered a factor relevant to whether pay differentials in
intercollegiate coaching are justified.3 92 Most often, conditions related
to the pressures to win and generate revenue have been asserted to
justify paying the coach of a men's team a higher salary than the
coach of a women's team.3 93 • Neither factor, however, persuasively
establishes that the working conditions of men's and women's coaches
justify such widespread differences in salary as to shield universities
from Title IX liability.
As stated earlier, the OCR and the Policy Interpretation do not
permit revenue generation to justify salary differentials under Title
IX.39 4 In light of the positions taken by the OCR and the Policy
Interpretation, it is entirely inconsistent to consider pressure on a
coach to produce revenue as a relevant working condition in justifying
discrimination in coaching salaries under Title IX.395 In addition, the
pressure to win imposed upon many intercollegiate athletic coaches is
frequently a working condition of women's coaches who are paid
substantially less than the men's coaches. Consider the Bowers case,
in which the former coach of the women's basketball team at Baylor
392 See Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,417.
393 See, e.g., Stanley v. University of Southern Cal., 13 F.3d 1313, 1321-22 (9th
Cir. 1994) (discussing the need to generate revenue and the consequent pressures and
responsibilities created thereby); Carr, supra note 247, at C 12 (quoting Long Beach State
athletic director David O'Brien espousing the view that the ability to generate revenue
should be considered in determining the pay of the coach).
31 See supra notes 346-48 and accompanying text. See generally supra Part VI.A. 1.
.95 See Reid, supra note 288, at E7 (quoting Timothy Stoner, chief counsel of the
WBCA arguing that pressures and responsibilities of raising revenue are discounted
because Title IX does not permit discrimination in base salaries based upon revenue
generation).
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University396 alleged that the university subjected her to terms and
conditions of employment different from the coach of the men's team.
There, the university explicitly stated that it fired her because she did
not win enough.397
The pressure on women's coaches to win is amplified by the
nature of the short-term and informal contracts which are prevalent
in women's coaching positions.39 In fact, the turnover rates for
men's and women's coaches are not very far apart. According to the
WBCA, twenty-four new coaches took over women's programs in the
1993-94 season.399 Comparatively, the National Association of
Basketball Coaches found that before the 1992-93 season, thirty-two
new coaches took over men's programs.
Clearly, neither the pressure to win nor the pressure to
produce revenue should be considered in justifying higher salaries for
coaches of men's programs as compared with coaches of women's
programs. Where such working conditions are asserted to justify
higher salaries, the pressures to win and produce revenue are not
valid differences in working conditions related to employment to
shield a university from Title IX liability based upon unequal pay. To
allow otherwise is contrary to the OCR and the Policy Interpretation.
Once the educational purpose of intercollegiate athletics is
realized, it is difficult to justify allocating disproportional funding to
men's athletics at the expense of women's athletic opportunities."'
However, disparate funding continues to exist between women's and
3' Bowers v. Baylor Univ., 862 F. Supp. 142 (W.D. Tex. 1994); see supra Part
V.B.
9 See Baylor Reaches Settlement, supra note 299 (reporting that "Baylor ... said
Bowers' dismissal was justified by her record (168-257 in 15 seasons, 13-14 in 1993-
94)").
398 See supra Part VI.A.2.
31 Moran, supra note 248, at B17.
4W Id.
4o See Nick Charles, Battle of the Sexes, Pt. 2 - Title IX Guidelines, CNN, May 29,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, SCRIPT File (quoting Iowa athletic director
Christine Grant as stating that "if we were discriminating in academics the way we're
discriminating in athletic scholarships, there'd be an uproar across the entire country");
Henderson, supra note 5, at 148 (arguing that "[a]s a central part of an educational
institution, the athletic departments should treat its student athletes as other academic
departments treat its students-on an equal basis").
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men's intercollegiate athletics.4 2 Furthermore, the disparity in pay
between the coaches of men's teams and the coaches of women's
teams demonstrates the lack of value, status, respect and importance
given to women athletes."
VII. Ramifications of Equal Pay Litigation
The recent growth of Title IX litigation and awareness of
gender discrimination, has prompted many universities to remedy
their discriminatory practices with regard to coaches' salaries. 4" Pay
equity has often come only after coaches have threatened to bring
lawsuits against their universities under either Title IX or the Equal
Pay Act.4"5 Christine Grant, the athletic director of women's sports
at the University of Iowa, found "[wlhen women threaten to go to
court or take them to court, they're winning hands down, absolutely
hands down."4 6 Although the average base salary for a women's
coach ($44,961)407 is still just fifty-nine percent of the base salary for
the coach of a men's team ($76,566),4"8 some universities have taken
steps in the right direction.40 9
o Henderson, supra note 5, at 148. According to the NCAA Gender Equity Study,
although women athletes number thirty percent of the total number of athletes in
intercollegiate athletics, they receive, on average, less than twenty-four percent of the
budget expenditures and less than eighteen percent of the available recruiting funds. See
id. at 158 (citing the NCAA Gender Equity Study, Summary of Results issued in March
1992).
1 See George, supra note 347, at 570 (stating that "the vast difference in the
coaches' salaries suggests that our women athletes are less important than their male
counterparts"); Woman Golf Coach Seeks Equal Salary, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993,
at C5 (reporting the filing of a 1993 lawsuit under the Equal Pay Act and Title IX in
which Oklahoma State's women's golf coach was seeking pay equal to the men's golf
coach and noting that the complaint stated that the pay differential "helps create and
perpetuate an environment at the university which relegates women's athletics to an
inferior and subordinate position to men's athletics") (internal quotation marks omitted).
' Mike Dame, Many Lawsuits Later, Women Still Not Equal; The Push for Gender
Equity has Stirred Courts-But Not Playing Fields, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 21, 1994,
at Cl; see supra Part IV and infra text accompanying notes 406-27.
See infra text accompanying notes 416-24.
, Dame, supra note 404, at C .
Herwig, supra note 320, at 8C.
4W id.
409 id.
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A number of women's head basketball coaches now-receive
pay comparable to their male counterparts.41 In 1993, for example,
the University of Virginia raised the salary of the head coach of the
women's basketball team, Debbie Ryan, to $106,000 to match the
head coach of the men's team.4 ' Pat Summitt, head coach of the
women's basketball team at the University of Tennessee recently
received a new five-year contract paying her $110,000 a year.41 2 In
addition, Vivian Stringer, new head coach of the women's basketball
team at Rutgers University, signed a seven-year contract which
reportedly will pay her between $150,000 and $300,000 per year. 4' 3
For these coaches, pay raises were the result of hard work and
accomplishment, rather than threatened litigation.41 4 For many more
coaches of women's teams, pay equity has not yet been achieved 415 or
has come about only by the threat of litigation.41 6
For example, last year, University of Oregon ("Oregon")
women's basketball coach Jody Runge received a four-year contract
which increased her base salary from $48,000 to $80,000 with the
opportunity to earn bonuses for bringing her team to the NCAA
tournament.417  Although Oregon interim athletic director Dan
Williams described the pay raise as "another effort by Oregon to
410 Cf. Weiner, supra note 384, at IC (commenting on "a national curve that is seeing
the salaries of women's basketball coaches rise to levels at or near their male
counterparts"). As of 1994, at least forty-three Division I women's basketball coaches
were making a minimum of $78,000. Id.
41" Deardorff, supra note 322, at 1.
412 Id. A five year contract was considered a breakthrough for Coach Summitt, who
has won three national championships, because over the last 19 years she had been
employed solely under one year contracts. Id.
4" A Call to Build, SPORTING NEWS, Sept. 18, 1995, at 63 [Hereinafter Call to
Build].
414 Deardorff, supra note 322, at 1 (showing that Pat Summit's base pay was raised
from $70,836 to $110,000 and that Debbie Ryan's salary was raised to match the men's
basketball coach, Jeff Jones, at $106,000). Coach Stringer's winning percentage, at
.794, is the fourth highest among the coaches of women's basketball. See Call to Build,
supra note 413, at 63.
415 See infra notes 427-30 and accompanying text.
416 See infra text accompanying notes 416-24.
417 Oregon Basketball Coach Doubles Her Salary, NEWS TRIBUNE (Washington),
Apr. 16, 1995, at CI1.
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increase opportunities for women," '418 this "new way of thinking
41 9
was brought about only by the threat of a lawsuit.420
Also wanting to avoid a lawsuit, the University of Georgia
("Georgia"), in 1994, decided to raise Georgia women's basketball
coach Andy Landers' salary from $58,160421 to $96,750422 which is
on par with the $99,080 salary of the men's basketball coach. 423 The
raise, however, came only after Coach Landers had retained an
attorney.424 Despite this progress, it is necessary to recognize that the
pay increases for women's coaches are not the norm, but rather,
exceptions to the rule. 425 The growing trend towards equality in pay,
has only begun to effect the huge disparity in funding for coaches of
men's teams and coaches of women's teams.42 6According to a 1992 NCAA study, the average expenditures
made by each Division I school for the head coaches of women's
sports was $149,740, compared to $272,057 for the coaches of men's
sports.427 In addition, the U.S.. General Accounting Office found that,
including base salary and other benefits earned from bonuses and
endorsements, head coaches of men's intercollegiate basketball teams
were paid an average of $110,180 per year. In contrast, the head
coaches of women's intercollegiate basketball teams received an
annual average salary of $44,996.428
Individual comparisons also demonstrate the lack of gender
418 Id.
41 Id. (quoting Coach Runge's description of the trend toward gender equity among
salaries of coaches of men's and women's intercollegiate athletic teams).
420 Id.
421 Reid, supra note 288, at El.
42 Scott M. Reid, Georgia's Salary Dispute Resolved Dooley, Coaches Don't Quibble
Over 'a Few Thousand, 'ATLANTA J. & CONST., Mar. 19, 1994, at C6.
423 Reid, supra note 288, at El.
424 Coach Andy Landers brought a Title IX claim against the University of Georgia
to contest the compensation he was receiving as the women's basketball coach compared
to that of the men's coach. Id.
Q5 Herwig; supra note 320, at 8C.
426 See infra notes 427-30 and accompanying text.
427 NCAA STUDY, supra note 388, at 7 tbl. 4 (1992).
428 U.S GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS:
COMPENSATION VARIES FOR SELECTED PERSONNEL IN ATHLETIC DEPARTMENT 10-11
(1992).
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equity in the funding of intercollegiate athletic coaches. For example,
the coach of the women's basketball team at the University of Kansas,
Marion Washington, is paid $55,000 a year, whereas Roy Williams,
the coach of the men's team is paid $98,000 a year.429 Also, Cindy
Russo, coach of the women's basketball team at Florida International
is paid $45,000 a year as compared to the men's coach's $115,000 a
year salary. 430  However, over the past few years, universities have
started to notice how equally valuable, dedicated and respected
women's coaches are. In doing so, many universities equally
compensate their women's and men's athletic team coaches.
VIII. The Role of Universities
Even with many of the new developments at different
universities,43' the Women's Sports Foundation and the OCR have
found that ninety-five percent of colleges still do not comply with
Title IX.432 Despite the success which has been achieved through
threatened litigation, colleges and universities should be willing to
move toward gender equity on their own. The educational purpose
of intercollegiate athletics must be recognized.433 Universities should
429 id.
430 1d. But see Bill Shaikin, Coach Stanley Standing Her (New) Ground, THE PRESS-
ENTERPRISE (California), Dec. 4, 1996, at D2 (stating that in 1996 the head coach of the
University of California's basketball team will be paid a salary equal to the salary of the
coach of the men's basketball team).
431 See supra Parts IV.A-C and VII. Between 1984 and 1988, approximately 450
new NCAA women's teams have been created. Cynthia J. Harris, Comment, The
Reform of Women's Intercollegiate Athletes: Title IX, Equal Protection, and Supplemental
Methods, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 691, 704 (1995). Since 1992, an additional 800 new
NCAA women's teams have been created. Tarkan, supra note 205, at 25.
432 Dame, supra note 404, at C I; see Harris, supra note 431, at 695. In addition,
the latest NCAA gender equity study shows that three-fourths of the funds spent
nationally on intercollegiate athletics go to the men's programs. Id.
433 See NCAA CONST. art. 1.3.1, reprinted in NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC
ASSOCIATION, 1992-93 NCAA MANUAL (stating the purpose of the NCAA: "The
competitive athletics programs of member institutions are designed to be a vital part of
the educational system. A basic purpose of this Association is to maintain intercollegiate
athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the athlete as an integral part
of the student body . . .) ." Id.; George, supra note 347, at 570 (arguing that if one
does not recognize the educational function of intercollegiate athletics then it is difficult
to justify spending so much money on them); Henderson, supra note 5, at 148 (stating
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aspire both to "the spirit of gender equality as well as to the letter of
the law." '43 4 If gender equity in intercollegiate athletics is to be
realized, universities must recognize that Title IX is the law,435 and
should conduct self-assessments of their programs in order to ensure
compliance with the equal opportunity mandate of Title IX.436 To
determine whether they are in compliance, universities must look
mainly at their substantial proportionality ratios.' Yet, schools must
also recognize that equal athletic opportunities are not important just
because they are mandated by federal law. Athletic competition is an
integral part of a complete education.438 It teaches student athletes
how to accomplish goals through teamwork and commitment as well
as providing valuable experience in setting and achieving goals and
performing under pressure.439
In addition, universities must be cautious when budgetary
constraints force them to eliminate sports teams.440 One method of
that athletics are "a central part of an educational institution").
3 George, supra note 347, at 570.
411 Miguel, supra note 238, at 289.
436 Johnson, supra note 68, at 584; Henderson, supra note 5, at 149; see also supra
Part IV.A-B. Some schools have begun to conduct self-evaluations to ensure compliance
with Title IX. See, e.g., Ragan Ingram, AUM Studies Compliance with Title IX,
MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (Alabama), Jan. 25, 1996, at ID (describing Auburn
University's gender equity committee which studies Title IX compliance at the school and
makes recommendations on required changes).
"' Johnson, supra note 68, at 584; see supra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
But see Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., 912 F. Supp. 892, 913 (M.D. La. 1996)
(holding that proportionality ratios alone cannot win or lose a case, rather they are merely
factors to consider in determining whether schools are effectively accommodating the
athletic interests and abilities of their women students).
431 See supra text accompanying note 243; OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS:
REQUIREMENTS UNDER TITLE IX OF THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1.
439 Lynette Labinger & Arthur Bryant, P.R. Can't Make Brown's Athletic Policies
Fair or Legal, PROVIDENCE J., Nov. 27, 1995, at B5.
440 Johnson, supra note 68, at 583; see Blum, supra note 205, at 30 (quoting Ellen
J. Vargyas, National Women's Legal Center Senior Counsel, saying that "responding to
budgetary constraints by cutting women's sports . . . is unacceptable"). As a result of
the success which Title IX litigation has recently brought to women collegiate athletes,
the difficult task of maintaining balanced budgets and providing the equal athletic
opportunities required by Title IX is an issue which universities and colleges will continue
to face as growing numbers of intercollegiate athletes and coaches seek remedies for
discriminatory treatment. See Reid, supra note 288, at E6 (quoting Florida State Athletic
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maintaining Title IX compliance, while attempting to effectively deal
with the fiscal constraints faced by many universities," 1 may be to try
reallocating funds away from teams where men are disproportionally
over-represented.442 The courts have recognized that it is not a
violation of Title IX to reallocate funds away from a team where one
gender is over-represented and use the funds to provide athletic
opportunities for the under-represented athletes." 3 However, it is also
important to avoid the elimination of men's varsity teams."4 The
Director Jeremy Foley as stating "the biggest dilemma facing us in college athletics right
now [is] [h]ow do we do the right thing and treat both men's and women's program[s]
equitably and remain financially stable?"). For suggestions made by this Note, see infra
notes 442-48 and accompanying text.
" Despite the breadth of budgetary constraints faced by many institutions of higher
education, universities must recognize that they are required to comply with the equal
opportunity provisions of Title IX. See Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp.
1507, 1518 (D. Colo. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom., Roberts v.
Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct
580 (1993); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737, 750 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated
as moot, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993); Favia v. Indiana Univ., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D.
Pa. 1993), mot. to modify order denied, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Henderson,
supra note 5, at 159 (recognizing that "the fiscal pressures on colleges and universities
[are] great, but the duty of these institutions to comply with Title IX and its gender equity
principles is even greater").
442 See Johnson, supra note 68, at 584. For example, one option is to reduce the
number of players on a football team, for which there is no comparable sport for women
collegiate athletes. 'See Miguel, supra note 238, at 289; see also Henderson, supra note
5, at 159-60 (recommending that football expenditures be reformed and a portion be
allocated toward less funded women's sports); Wilde, supra note 3, at 225 (describing
how intercollegiate football is a uniquely men's sport and arguing that large squads cause
athletic opportunities to be disproportionately skewed in favor of men).
" See, e.g., Kelley v. Board of Trustees, Univ. of Ill., 832 F. Supp. 237, 241
(C.D. III. 1993) (approving the elimination of a men's swimming program in the face of
budget constraints where men were already substantially over-represented in the
university's athletics), aff'd, 35 F.3d 265 (7th Cir. 1994). In addition, on May 17, 1994,
a California state court judge refused to order a preliminary injunction forcing the
University of California at Los Angeles to reinstate the men's swimming and gymnastics
teams. Id. The Court held that Title IX allows elimination of a team where that gender
already has a disproportionate number of athletes in participation in the intercollegiate
athletics of their school. See Miguel, supra note 238, at 289; NCAA REGISTER, supra
note 36, at 8.
4" Johnson, supra note 68, at 585. See generally Ted Curtis, Wrestling with Title
IX Compliance and Men's Sports Programs, 13 ENT. & SPORTS LAW 1 (1995); Ted
Curtis, Men's Sports Programs and Title IX Compliance in Intercollegiate Athletics, 69
FLA. B.J. 63 (1995).
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purpose of Title IX is not to limit men's athletics, but to achieve
gender equity."'
Additionally, school administrators might look to women's
club teams or other groups who have requested varsity status and
elevate them where appropriate." 6 This solution has received explicit
support from the courts." 7  Another solution may be to create a
women's junior-varsity team for an already popular women's varsity
sport." 8  In deciding which particular method of compliance the
university will choose, the school should, however, be as mindful of
the life-long educational lessons which athletic competitions provide,
as they are of Title IX's regulatory requirements.
Whether college and university athletic departments will
continue to seek solutions and move toward compliance in providing
equal opportunities to women intercollegiate athletes remains to be
seen. It is clear, however, that Title IX has "explode[d] on the
college scene."" 9 As a result of the Supreme Court's decision to
make monetary damages available for intentional sex discrimination, 450
violations of Title IX may soon become too costly for college and
44 Kelley, 832 F. Supp. at 241. In 1994, the newly created NCAA Gender Equity
Task Force stated one of its objectives was "an increase in the participation of women
rather than a reduction of participation opportunities for men." Gender-Equity Panel
Works to Identify Goals, THE NCAA NEWS, July 22, 1992, at 1.
44 Johnson, supra note 68, at 584. This approach was taken by the University of
Michigan which recently elevated the women's soccer team from club to varsity status
while-funding it by eliminating men's gymnastics. Stellmach, supra note 7, at 212.
17 See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 212 (D. R.I. 1995)
(indicating that elevating an existing team to intercollegiate status is a satisfactory method
of complying with Title IX).,
Under the three-part effective accommodation test provided in the Policy
Interpretation, supra text accompanying note 38, the creation of a new team for an
under-represented class of intercollegiate athletes would be evidence that the "members
of th[e] [under-represented] sex have been fully and effectively accommodated by the
present program." Policy Interpretation, supra note 38, at 71,418; see Cohen, 879 F.
Supp. at 211-12.
448 Miguel, supra note 238, at 300.
'9 Reid, supra note 288, at E6 (quoting Tim Stoner, Chief Counsel for the WBCA).
450 Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (holding that
monetary damages are available under Title IX for intentional discrimination).
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university athletic departments to sustain.45'
IX. Conclusion
The 1990's have signaled that Title IX has become a strong
force in intercollegiate athletics.452  The gender equity issue has
become forefront at universities and colleges.453 The compliance
cases illustrate that Title IX will be enforced.454 However, many
schools are still ignoring the recent developments. 4" It has been
found that ninety-five percent of colleges still do not comply with
Title IX. 456 Thus, if schools do not make more of an effort to adhere
to the statute and take active steps towards gender equity, an abundant
number of lawsuits can be expected.457 Moreover, although there has
been recognition of the importance of the equal pay in coaching issue
and its effects,458 the disparity in salaries between the coaches of
women's teams and the coaches of men's teams remains immense.459
If institutions of higher education continue to move in the right
direction, however, eventually gender equity in intercollegiate
athletics may no longer be an issue. Thus, athletic competition in
colleges and universities will serve its educational purpose-teaching
the values of teamwork, courage, commitment, and fair play.
Rikki Ades
4" See, e.g., supra notes 416-24 and accompanying text; see also Reid, supra note
422, at C6 (describing settlement of Title IX suit between women athletic coaches and
the University of Georgia and quoting Athletic Director Vince Dooley's explanation that
it was preferable to bring the women coaches' salaries more in line with the salaries of
the coaches of men's teams than defend a Title IX lawsuit).
41' Thro & Snow, supra note 2, at 611.
411 Id; see supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
41 Wilde, supra note 3, at 245; see also supra Part III.A-E.
411 Id.; Henderson, supra note 5, at 134 (noting that although Title IX has increased
awareness of the gender equity issue, "most institutions of higher education still do not
comply with Title IX").
41 Dame, supra note 404, at C 1.
41 Wilde, supra note 3, at 245.
458 Id. at 217.
4." See supra notes 425-30 and accompanying text.
